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1501 
Legal Regimes and Political Particularism: An 
Assessment of the “Legal Families” Theory from the 
Perspectives of Comparative Law and Political 
Economy 
John W. Cioffi 
ABSTRACT: The “legal families” theory of corporate law and 
ownership structures pioneered by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny provides one of the most 
influential accounts of why “law matters” in shaping economic 
organization and outcomes. However, the empirical bases and 
theoretical logic of the theory contain serious flaws and limitations. 
First, as has been pointed out by a number of critics engaged in this 
revision, the legal origins literature contains numerous problematic 
characterizations of substantive law that expose the serious problems of 
quantitative operationalization of legal rules as a mode of comparative 
legal analysis. Second, the econometrics analysis of broad, cross-national 
patterns of legal and financial system characteristics departs from the 
theoretical and practical concerns of law as an academic and 
professional discipline focused on intra-systemic behavior. Third, the 
legal families theory is essentially an underspecified, path-dependent 
account of political economic development that is, at the very least, in 
logical tension with observable changes in law and financial system 
structures of both the past and present. Fourth, the methodology does not 
adequately distinguish between countries in which the rule of law and 
functional political and legal institutions are well-established 
(generally the advanced industrial countries) and those in which they 
are not (generally less developed countries (LDCs), often with 
significant post-colonial legacies). Given these flaws in, and limitations 
of, the legal families theory, the intuitively appealing thesis that law 
matters must be resituated in a more empirically persuasive and 
historically sensitive account of the relationship between law and 
politics. I speculate that any meaningful correlation between legal 
 
 Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Riverside; Ph.D., 
University of California, Berkeley, 2002; J.D., Rutgers School of Law-Newark, 1990. 
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origins and economic outcomes is the product of politics in the first 
instance rather than law, and that legal families likely function as a 
proxy for different forms of political economic organization. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The “legal origins” (or “legal families”) theory of corporate law 
and ownership structures pioneered by Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (LLSV) has 
become one of most influential accounts of why “law matters” to 
economic organization and outcomes.1 The literature written and 
inspired by LLSV seeks to explain significant variations in the 
ownership structures and financial market development of a wide 
range of countries around the world and has grown vastly in size and 
complexity. Their core contentions are well-known: legal systems 
around the world are largely derived from a discrete set of “legal 
families” and these origins have had a substantial and systematic 
influence on current national legal and, thus, financial structures. 
Anglo-American common law origins are associated with stronger 
minority shareholder protections and disclosure rules, and higher 
levels of equity finance. They are also correlated with dispersion of 
shareholding, the separation of ownership and control, securities 
market development, and higher rates of economic growth. 
Scandinavian, German, and French civil law traditions are generally 
correlated, in descending order, with weaker shareholder 
protections, greater financial opacity and opportunities for insider 
rent-seeking, and lower scores on economic outcome measures.  
 
 1. For LLSV’s direct contributions to this literature, see Rafael La Porta et al., 
Government Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN. 265 (2002); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor 
Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002) [hereinafter La Porta et al., 
Investor Protection]; Rafael La Porta et al., Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the 
World, 55 J. FIN. 1 (2000); Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 
J. FIN. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
222 (1999) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Quality of Government]; Rafael La Porta et al., Law 
and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance]; 
Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); see also 
Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430 (2008); 
Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 
(2008) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Economic Consequences of Legal Origins]; Rafael La Porta et 
al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006) [hereinafter La Porta et al., What 
Works in Securities Laws?]; Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. 
ECON. 445 (2004); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 
52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/10/2010 12:48 PM 
1501 Legal Regimes and Political Particularism 
 1503 
However, the theoretical logic and empirical bases of the legal 
origins theory have been subjected to withering criticism. The theory 
resurrected the problematic distinction between common and civil 
law traditions—long dismissed by many comparative legal scholars as 
over-simplified and a misrepresentation of how legal systems actually 
work—and presented the distinction as an important determinant of 
economic organization, financial development, and growth. It 
appealed to the intuitive belief that both history (including colonial 
legacies) and law matter in the course and relative success of 
economic development. It did so, however, by greatly simplifying 
the characterization of historical and juridical phenomena. On a 
more practical and policy-oriented level, the theory and the literature 
it spawned privileged finance—and market-driven finance in 
particular—within the wider terrain of political economic ordering 
and effectively promoted pro-shareholder and market enabling legal 
mechanisms as crucial foundations for the growth of equity finance, 
the dispersion of shareholding, and growth of the broader financial 
system and economic development.2 The pro-finance ideological and 
policy thrust of this literature came at a time when financial crises 
were recurrent and increasingly serious. Now, these financial crises 
have culminated in a global financial collapse and a worldwide Great 
Recession.  
I review four crucial weaknesses of the legal origins literature 
from the perspective of comparative law and political economy.3 
First, commentators have criticized the LLSV work for numerous 
problematic or erroneous characterizations of substantive law that 
indicate serious problems of quantitative operationalization.4 These 
issues of characterization and coding of legal rules remain 
contentious and difficult to resolve. The challenges become even 
 
 2. In this sense, the legal origins theory, as an application of neo-classical micro-
economics, lends itself to policy prescriptions supported by comparative statics. LLSV, 
however, generally leave these implications oblique and hedged by their acknowledgement that 
there is no single optimal juridical governance regime.  
 3. By “comparative political economy,” I refer to the study of the systemic 
interrelations between political power and institutions, and economic organization and 
practices. This conception of political economy is entirely distinct from the definition of the 
term as the use of economic theory and methods to study political phenomenon (though it by 
no means precludes the use of such approaches), a prominent example of which is the legal 
families literature itself. 
 4. See, e.g., Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric 
Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 17 (2007).  
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greater when one seeks to account for changes in legal concepts, 
norms, and rules over time.  
Second, these problems of measurement point to deeper and 
more intractable theoretical and practical criticisms of the legal 
origins theory. Measurement difficulties implicate issues that go 
beyond methodological concerns to the theoretical logic and 
substantive understanding of law, economic organization, and 
political economy. Difficulties in operationalizing legal and political 
characteristics into useful quantitative variables not only call the 
empirical findings into question, they also raise serious doubts about 
the appropriateness of large-n quantitative methodology in the study 
of legal rules and institutions as a mode of comparative legal analysis. 
The reduction of complex legal provisions, their even more complex 
interaction effects, and mechanisms (and effectiveness) of 
enforcement to numerical form is at best extremely difficult; at 
worst, it distorts available data in ways that undermine findings at the 
levels of individual country cases and of broader comparative analysis.  
Third, the legal families theory presents an exceedingly and 
problematically deterministic and path dependent view of law, 
institutions, and economic performance. The theory maintains that 
legal structures are path dependent and have a predictable long-term 
influence on economic behavior. It follows that the theory depends 
empirically on the continuity of both legal and corporate ownership 
structures. However, the historical record casts doubt on the 
continuity of country-level stock ownership patterns and national 
legal frameworks, let alone on the relationship between the two. As 
Rajan and Zingales have shown, economic history contains a number 
of “great reversals” in financial system organization and shareholding 
patterns. While national economies cannot change the origin of their 
legal system, in some cases they have shifted between a market-based 
and bank-based financial system, and between diffuse and 
concentrated shareholding structures, while it could not change the 
origin of its legal system.5 Conversely, more recent sweeping reforms 
of financial market regulation and corporate governance around the 
world in the last two decades (and likely to accelerate in the near 
future) substantially undermine a theoretical argument based on path 
 
 5. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial 
Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003). 
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dependence and call into question many of the LLSV measures and 
codings.  
Fourth, the legal origins theory does not adequately grapple with 
the differences between countries in which the rule of law and 
functional political and legal institutions are well-established 
(generally the advanced industrial countries) and those in which they 
are not (generally LDCs, which often have significant post-colonial 
legacies). One of the most ambitious aspects of the LLSV enterprise 
is its vast inclusiveness. But the same analytical approach, particularly 
one that takes the operation of law and legal institutions as 
fundamental in the causal analysis of economic outcomes, may not 
be appropriate across the entire spectrum of countries as classified by 
relative economic and/or institutional development. On the one 
hand, one of the intuitively appealing features of legal origins theory 
is that it purports to establish that “law matters” for economic 
organization and outcomes. On the other hand, if legal origins 
explain cross-national variation despite a large number of country 
cases in which the rule of law and the functionality of legal 
institutions is not, or is barely, established, it would seem to suggest 
that law does not matter. If this is true, it must be something else 
that matters. 
This leads to a final speculation that, outside of the advanced 
industrial nations where the rule of law and legal institutions are 
generally well established, LLSV’s quantitative analyses—if they are 
in fact measuring anything—are likely indirectly measuring political 
differences rather than legal ones. The speculation is that the 
characteristics of different legal families at the foundation of legal 
origins theory reflect differences in political origins of states and 
polities that have had an enduring effect on economic, and 
particularly financial, development. Accordingly, the intuitively 
appealing thesis that law matters must be resituated in a more 
persuasive and historically sensitive account of the relationship 
between law and politics. These considerations frame a counter-
hypothesis to the legal origins theory: any meaningful correlation 
between legal families and economic outcomes is the product of 
politics, in the first instance, rather than law. Legal families likely 
function as a proxy for different forms of political economic 
organization established by colonialism where they were imposed, or 
as elective affinity where foreign legal and governance frameworks 
were voluntarily adopted. The law-as-proxy relationship is 
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particularly likely where the rule of law has been and remains weak, 
and where legal institutions are relatively underdeveloped and lack 
autonomous capacity to articulate, apply, and enforce legal rules and 
standards. 
II. WHY LEGAL ORIGINS? 
The legal families theory is one of the rare instances where 
academic research has spawned a virtual cottage industry of scholars 
from an array of fields and subfields working to extend or critique it. 
This literature poses an initial question: Why has the theory become 
so prominent and influential? A number of factors help explain why 
the LLSV legal origins theory has become so visible and influential in 
a wide range of academic disciplines and debates. 
First, it speaks to a wide range of debates cutting across a vast 
array of disciplines. The legal origins theory and analyses contributed 
to the study of financial regulation, corporate governance regimes, 
financial market development, ownership structures, state 
intervention in the economy, corruption and the rule of law, 
institutional capacity and development, and the relationships among 
law, legal institutions, and economic growth. Scholars spanning the 
fields of law, economics, management, political science, history, 
sociology, and geography could benefit from engagement with this 
body of work, giving it a large potential audience. But a potentially 
large audience does not explain why it in fact developed. This leads 
to a second important characteristic of the legal origins literature. 
Legal origins theory has the intuitively and, perhaps just as 
importantly, professionally appealing characteristic of contending 
and adducing proof for the proposition that “law matters.” Not only 
do legal structures have an important and enduring impact on 
individual behavior, but legal history is also particularly important for 
explaining significant variations in economic organization and 
performance. The theory countered more doctrinaire versions of law 
and economics that elevated the post-Coase, Jensen, and Meckling 
contractualist paradigm and the private ordering of economic 
relations to the position of first principles—and often to the status of 
first and last policy prescriptions. Legal origins theory, emerging in 
the mid-1990s heyday of neo-liberalism and globalization-inspired 
convergence theories, pointed to a very different view of the role and 
efficacy of law, and therefore of politics. This no doubt appeals to 
many lawyers and legal scholars, who are quite naturally inclined to 
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think they study important and consequential, rather than 
epiphenomenal and ineffectual, aspects of social life. It also resonates 
with scholars and policy practitioners hailing from many disciplines 
and professional positions who are not reconciled or are deeply 
opposed to the absence of meaningful political and juridical agency 
implied by deterministic social science theories and the frequently 
laissez faire biases of much of law and economics.  
However, the legal families theory remained firmly anchored in 
neo-classical economic theory in an era in which the discipline and 
theoretical apparatus of economics expanded its influence, empirical 
reach, and scope of substantive concerns. It emerged during a period 
(still ongoing despite a recent flurry of criticisms of academic 
economics) in which other social science disciplines increasingly 
appropriated the analytical framework of neo-classical economics and 
the tools of econometric analysis. Whether welcomed and praised as 
the harbinger of increasing theoretical and empirical rigor across the 
social sciences, or denounced as a case of ideologically-driven 
disciplinary imperialism, the undeniable fact is that, for better or 
worse, in recent decades economics has become the dominant 
intellectual current within the social sciences and policy circles. 
Accordingly, LLSV and the legal families theory became an especially 
visible example of a broader intellectual zeitgeist.  
Further, the legal origins literature as developed by LLSV is an 
extraordinary achievement regardless of one’s agreement with or 
rejection of the theory or of their findings. The vast and 
extraordinarily labor-intensive exercise of seeking to operationalize a 
huge number of legal, economic, historical, and political variables, 
use them to advance sophisticated modeling and quantitative 
analysis, and do this for a large number of industrialized and 
developing countries was—and remains—an exceptionally ambitious 
undertaking. This complex methodology reflected and embodied the 
trends across the social sciences, especially evident in political 
science, toward large-n quantitative studies as the gold standard of 
research and the increasing centrality of rational choice theories 
based on economic theory in a widening range of disciplines.6 By the 
 
 6. See, e.g., GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE 
IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994) (one of the most influential volumes on comparative 
methodology in political science of the past thirty years and consistently advocating larger-n 
studies as necessary to buttress the validity of findings and causal inferences); cf. COMPARATIVE 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (James Mahoney & Dietrich Reuschmeyer 
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1990s, large-n statistical analysis had become a principal, if not 
dominant, method of social science research and approach to 
comparative analysis. In legal academia, the legal origins theory 
melded the growing influence of law and economics with the 
growing interest in the interdisciplinary study of law and legal 
institutions, even as it tended to provoke resistance from legal 
scholars wedded to traditional modes of legal analysis and immersed 
in the qualitative and discursive details of legal rules, doctrines, and 
theories within particular national systems.  
The LLSV legal families project also benefited from fortuitous 
historical timing in a broader sense. The development of the legal 
origins theory formed part of a great wave of academic research 
related to the law, economics, and politics of financial systems, and 
corporate governance gathered momentum. The economic 
upheavals of the 1970s and 1980s precipitated a crisis of the postwar 
economic order at national and international levels. The 
manifestations of this crisis (or these crises) included the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods international monetary regime, stagflation, 
monetarism, deindustrialization, waves of mergers and acquisitions, 
and an explosive growth of international financial markets. These 
developments enhanced the structural power and economic 
centrality of finance, and implicated structures and practices of 
corporate governance as increasingly important to economic 
performance and public policy. By the 1990s, the financialization of 
the economy was not only a central dynamic of the liberal market 
Anglo-American political economies, it was also a core structural 
attribute of what was popularly (and loosely) identified as 
globalization in which neo-liberalism and the American economic 
model loomed as increasingly influential. This made the systematic 
study of finance and its relationships to law and politics increasingly 
important and attractive not only because it sought to understand 
the economic order (or orders), but also because it attempted to 
frame and empirically ground policy prescriptions in developed and 
developing countries alike in a way that consistently favored the 
 
eds., 2003) (presenting a competing methodological approach based on careful historical and 
qualitative case study and small-n research); RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, 
SHARED STANDARDS (Henry E. Brady & David Collier eds., 2004) (staking out an 
intermediate position between the quantitative, statistically-driven large-n methods and 
qualitative, historically grounded approaches). 
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adoption and facilitation of market-driven financial and economic 
models.  
The legal origins theory articulated in LLSV’s work emerged as 
countries around the world began to reform their corporate 
governance and financial systems to spur economic adjustment and 
accommodate global financial flows. Countries pursued these goals 
in an effort to achieve higher growth rates. LLSV supplied 
policymakers with something often lacking in academic literature: 
the basis for framing clear policy prescriptions. The legal families 
theory purported to diagnose the juridical and institutional strengths 
and ills of many economies, while simultaneously pointing to a set of 
specific legal features and institutional arrangements conducive to 
the dispersion of equity ownership, the development of financial 
markets, and increased economic growth. The LLSV theory and 
analysis of comparative corporate governance and its relationship to 
relative economic success became highly influential not only within 
the academy, but also beyond it in national and international policy 
circles.7 
In short, in many ways LLSV’s timing was ideal for their 
extended foray into large-n econometric analysis of law and finance, 
and propitious for finding a broad audience for what they had to say 
and how they said it. However, as discussed below, the spread of 
financial system and corporate governance reform also posed 
problems for the legal origins theory. Ironically, legal reformers in 
many countries used LLSV’s profoundly historically deterministic 
model of legal and economic structures as an intellectual justification 
for technocratic and often controversial structural reforms in 
securities and company law. The very fact that these reforms 
occurred undermined the deterministic and path dependent logic of 
the legal origins theory.8 The acceleration of legal and institutional 
change during an era of rapid financial globalization and neo-liberal 
 
 7. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 460, 463–64 (2006) (discussing the influence of the LLSV literature on 
policymakers).  
 8. Cf. MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 166–67 (2006) [hereinafter ROE, POLITICAL 
DETERMINANTS] (critiquing the reduction of highly politicized legal structures to technical 
juridical fixes to technical economic problems). 
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reform made the path dependence of the legal origins theory appear 
increasingly anachronistic and self-contradictory.9   
Reform posed a set of practical and theoretical challenges. If the 
legal origins theory was indeed correct, how could reform become so 
prevalent, and could it be effective? The near ubiquity of legal reform 
around the world underscored the paucity of politics in theories 
based on economics. What were the political dynamics of reform? 
How did reforms and antecedent rules and institutional 
arrangements affect economic performance and outcomes? These 
issues could not be captured in the correlational analysis and implicit 
comparative statistics of the legal origins theory. And if legal reform 
or financial system development could so rapidly shift in the 
contemporary era, might they not have experienced other periods of 
transformation in the past that would be inconsistent with the legal 
origins theory? Further, the politics of reform—and its substance—in 
the advanced industrial countries and in the developing and non-
developing world could hardly be equated or analyzed in the same 
way. The tasks of reforming legal regimes in countries with a long 
tradition of the rule of law and well-established legal and regulatory 
institutions is hardly comparable to political challenges of creating 
legal regimes very nearly from scratch in less developed countries.  
The reductionism of the LLSV treatment of legal rules as 
quantitatively operationalized variables and the breadth of their 
comparative analysis engendered substantial resistance by legal 
scholars. Lawyers and legal scholars may have been amenable to the 
finding that “law mattered” after all, but they typically have a far 
more nuanced understanding of how legal rules, their interpretation 
and application in practice, and enforcement mechanisms function as 
part of the systemic whole.10 Further, the systems of primary concern 
 
 9. See Ruth Aguilera & Cynthia Williams, “Law and Finance”: Inaccurate, Incomplete, 
and Important, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1413 (2009). 
 10. The “systemic whole,” in turn, can be conceptualized in multiple ways, ranging 
from the legal system narrowly defined as the body of formal legal rules adopted in a 
jurisdiction and the institutional means available for their interpretation, modification, 
application, and enforcement to a more expansive view of the political economy that 
encompasses political institutions, interest groups, social cleavages, forms of private economic 
organization, and market structures. The former framing is common to legal scholarship, 
which is understandably focused on legal rules and practices. The latter is the perspective 
cultivated in the field of comparative political economy and perhaps most explicitly in the 
“varieties of capitalism” literature. See, e.g., VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). 
Increasingly, scholars are attempting to integrate the analytical frameworks of comparative law 
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to legal scholars and professionals are narrower in institutional, 
jurisdictional, and political scope than the broad cross-national or 
global scope of large-n studies. Stated in terms of Holmesian legal 
realism, they are concerned with what courts (and other legal 
institutions and decision makers) will in fact do—that is, they are 
concerned with how legal rules will be used within the confines of a 
specific jurisdictionally defined and institutionally bounded context. 
The probability that country “X” will have a certain configuration of 
laws and institutional arrangements given a certain independent 
variable is distinct from the task of understanding the form and 
operation of law and legal institutions in specific national or sub-
national cases. The way in which LLSV conceptualized legal rules 
and institutions in quantitative analysis thus does not accord with 
many lawyers’ and legal scholars’ understandings of how law works 
in practice. Moreover, it also fails to comport with their 
understandable focus on how legal rules are or are not enforced and 
how these rules influence behavior within the jurisdictional and 
institutional confines of particular legal systems. The LLSV use of 
large-n econometric analysis and traditional legal analysis in many 
 
and comparative political economy. See, e.g., JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE 
POWER: THE COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN 
THE AGE OF FINANCE CAPITALISM (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND 
PRIVATE POWER]; PETER GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND 
CORPORATE CONTROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2005); 
CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES 
REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2008); YVES TIBERGHIEN, 
ENTREPRENEURIAL STATES: REFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FRANCE, JAPAN, AND 
KOREA (2007); Christopher A. Whytock, Taking Causality Seriously in Comparative 
Constitutional Law: Insights from Comparative Politics and Comparative Political Economy, 41 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629 (2008). It is noteworthy that these works recognize the importance of 
both law and politics as interacting elements of dynamic reform processes that are at once 
highly particularistic, yet share common features. The pioneering work of Mark Roe also 
bridged the study of law and political economy by explicating the historical and political 
foundations of national corporate governance regimes and their impact on the diffusion of 
shareholding and the separation of ownership and control. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG 
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 
(1994) [hereinafter ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS]; Mark J. Roe, Some 
Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 
1927 (1993) [hereinafter Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure]; Mark J. Roe, A 
Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991) [hereinafter 
Roe, Political Theory]; cf. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS, supra note 8 (developing an 
analysis of comparative corporate governance based more on neo-classical principal-agent 
theories of law and economics and statistical analysis, and less on historically grounded political 
analysis). 
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ways reflected different ontological commitments and practical 
concerns.  
III. MATH PROBLEMS—THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF LEGAL 
RULES 
Joining this critical push-back against the legal origins theory are 
a number of economists and quantitatively-oriented scholars who 
took issue with the LLSV coding of legal variables and thus with 
their findings—both of which appear to display a consistent bias in 
favor of common law systems and the liberal market (i.e., Anglo-
American) political economic model. A number of scholars have 
criticized LLSV and the legal origins theory for improper 
quantification of legal rules and concepts.11 These criticisms 
undermine the very foundation of a fundamentally statistical 
endeavor. Holger Spamann, for example, recently undertook to 
systematically review and, where appropriate, revise the measures of 
the legal variables LLSV used in their 1998 article Law and 
Finance.12 Reexamining the coding for the variables in LLSV’s 
influential “antidirector rights index” (ADRI), Spamann found that 
thirty-three of forty-six measures needed to be changed. The 
necessary changes resulted in a substantial diminution of 
correlational results.13 The statistical significance of the common law-
 
 11. See MARKUS BERNDT, GLOBAL DIFFERENCES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEMS: THEORY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORMS 17–18 (2002); REINIER R. KRAAKMAN 
ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
61 n.117 (2004); Udo C. Braendle, Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany—“Law 
and Finance” Revisited, 7 GERMAN L.J. 257 (2006); Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in 
Corporate Law Between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 697 (2005); Luca Enriques, Do Corporate Law Judges Matter? Some Evidence 
from Milan, 3 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 765, 779 n.43 (2002); Lele & Siems, supra note 4; 
Mathias M. Siems, Shareholder Protection Around the World (“Leximetric II”), 33 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 111 (2008). 
 12. Holger Spamann, ‘Law and Finance’ Revisited (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., 
& Bus., Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 12, 2008); cf. La Porta et al., Law and 
Finance, supra note 1, at 1126–28 (presenting the antidirector rights index). 
 13. Spamann, supra note 12, at 14. The ADRI variables quantify national law regarding 
“one share, one vote,” “proxy by mail allowed,” “shares not blocked before the meeting,” 
“cumulative voting,” “oppressed minorities mechanism,” “pre-emptive rights to new issues,” 
“share capital required to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting,” and “mandatory 
dividend.” Id. at 20. Joined by Simeon Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer have 
developed an alternative to the ADRI, Djankov et al., supra note 1, at 432–33 (presenting an 
anti-self-dealing index as the successor to the antidirector rights index), but this index has been 
criticized as even more problematic as a metric of legal variables. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & 
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civil law distinction disappeared with respect to the ADRI values or 
correlations with stock market size and shareholder dispersion—the 
two most important outcomes for the legal origins literature.14 
Strikingly, using corrected ADRI values, the German legal family 
scored the highest mean, followed by the Scandinavian, common 
law, and French families, respectively.15 The rating of the quality of 
shareholder protection under American law fell from five to two.16  
Lele and Siems criticize LLSV both for coding/quantification 
errors and, more importantly, for conceptualization problems that 
result in a failure to adequately account for shareholder decision-
making power, shareholder power to remove directors, board 
composition, or director self-dealing.17 They suggest that the pattern 
of omissions from the ADRI variables and the way in which they 
were defined had a pronounced pro-U.S. bias that consistently 
tended to raise the rating of American law and systematically lowered 
the scores of countries, like Germany, that have different, though in 
many ways effective, shareholder protections.18 Rejecting the LLSV 
ADRI variable definitions and constructing an entirely new index 
from sixty variables traced over thirty-five years for the United States, 
United Kingdom, Germany, France, and India, Lele and Siems 
found that shareholder protections improved for all countries over 
the entire period.19 However, beginning in approximately 1985, the 
United States became a notable laggard with its shareholder 
protections virtually unchanged until the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and related regulatory reforms following the Enron-era 
corporate scandals.20 Even then, the United States was found to 
provide the lowest level of protection of all the countries studied; 
Germany and France, virtually indistinguishable, were found to 
provide the highest.21 In a follow-up study extending the analysis to 
 
Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 
1279 n.54 and accompanying text (2009) (presenting criticisms of the anti-self-dealing index). 
 14. Spamann, supra note 12, at 15–17. 
 15. Id. at 14. Moreover, the French family’s lowest mean was not statistically significant. 
Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Lele & Siems, supra note 4, at 18–21. 
 18. Id. at 20–21. 
 19. Id. at 30–35. 
 20. See id. at 31–32 
 21. Id. at 31 fig.1. 
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twenty countries, including more from the developing world, Siems 
confirmed these findings and made the additional and surprising 
finding that German law is far closer to the international mean than 
the United States or the United Kingdom.22 Further, while many 
countries, particularly China, had converged on German law as 
measured by the index, the United States and United Kingdom had 
diverged from it.23  
Like the studies of LLSV before them, these studies do not, and 
perhaps cannot, adequately address the issue of enforcement. 
Enforcement is a notoriously difficult subject to study quantitatively, 
but this difficulty makes it no less critical to the description and 
assessment of a legal system.24 Part of the reason that enforcement is 
difficult to quantify centers on the limitations of available data.25 
Another reason for the difficulty lies in the inherent challenge of 
measuring the different substantive and procedural elements that 
affect enforcement rates and effectiveness along with the widely 
varying forms of enforcement that coexist even within the same legal 
and governance system. Spamann expressly notes that superior 
enforcement mechanisms, both public and private, in the United 
States likely compensate for the deficiencies of its substantive law.26 If 
included in the analysis, this greater enforcement capacity would 
presumably raise the rating of the effectiveness of shareholder 
protection under the law in the United States. Lele and Siems do 
include enforcement variables, but the definitions are derived entirely 
from formal characteristics of the law and these are incomplete.27 
They do not reflect, for instance, the differences in actual 
enforcement rates and practices, particularly private litigation, cross-
nationally.28  
 
 22. Siems, supra note 11, at 144. 
 23. Id. at 132. 
 24. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 229 (2007). 
 25. Data on litigation rates, even for a country as developed and as litigious as the 
United States, leaves much to be desired. Comparable cross-national data is virtually non-
existent.  
 26. See Spamann, supra note 12, at 18. 
 27. For example, they do not code for class-actions (or functionally analogous collective 
actions), contingency fee arrangements, or critically important discovery rules and their 
application in civil litigation. See Lele & Siems, supra note 4, at 22–25. 
 28. The high propensity for litigious enforcement in the United States compared to 
other countries is treated at length in the literature on adversarial legalism. See, e.g., ROBERT A. 
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These studies lead to a possibility, disquieting to those who place 
hope in the efficacy of legal reform to alter and improve economic 
performance, that law does not matter after all. The countries and 
the legal families with the highest revised scores are not correlated 
with shareholder dispersion or stock market development. I leave to 
the side the problematic claims that “Berle-Means” corporations, 
with dispersed shareholding, larger numbers of publicly traded firms, 
and a high stock market capitalization relative to GDP, are 
economically desirable and confer benefits in excess of costs to the 
political economies in which they are prevalent. Yet, there are still 
substantial grounds that support the contention that law matters as 
an important influence on economic behavior, organization, and 
development.  
The near-ubiquity and significance of pro-shareholder and 
market-enabling legal reforms around the world during the past 
twenty years suggest that law is an important influence on financial 
practices and economic development. These reforms have displayed a 
pronounced trend towards greater shareholder protection and 
transparency regulation—during the period of time when financial 
markets have exploded in size and holders of financial assets gained 
in political influence.29 It is apparent that governments and interest 
groups believe that law matters enough to devote substantial political 
and actual capital to getting it changed. Nevertheless, it may be far 
easier to change formal law and use largely symbolic legal change as 
investor/finance-friendly signaling, than to build up regulatory or 
judicial enforcement capacities.30 Powerful vested interests resist and 
 
KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001); Robert A. Kagan, 
Should Europe Worry About Adversarial Legalism?, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997). 
 29. See, e.g., GRANT KIRKPATRICK, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SURVEY OF OECD 
COUNTRIES (Organizations for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/27/21755678.pdf. 
 30. Milhaupt and Pistor, for example, characterize the post-Enron and WorldCom 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2003 in these terms, though they do concede that the 
law’s corporate governance provisions represent a potentially significant movement towards the 
federalization of state corporation law. MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 10, at 56–60; cf. 
John W. Cioffi, Revenge of the Law? Securities Litigation Reform and Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
Structural Regulation of Corporate Governance, in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS: THE 
POLITICS OF REGULATORY REFORM 60 (Marc K. Landy et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter Coiffi, 
Revenge of the Law] (arguing that Sarbanes-Oxley was a more substantive and path-breaking 
law than many critics have allowed, though also finding it deeply flawed by political constraints 
that precluded more fundamental reforms of corporate boards, the reform of proxy voting 
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seek to neuter substantive legal changes and enforcement 
mechanisms that challenge their authority and access to rents. State 
actors may seek to maintain control over the institutions and 
mechanisms of enforcement by opposing the cultivation of private 
litigation causes of action and procedures, either out of concern over 
the potential abuses and inefficiencies of litigation, or in order to 
preserve an important power resource.  
The politics—and political obstacles to effective reform—are 
likely to play themselves out somewhat differently in developed and 
developing countries. Viewed cross-nationally, there are diverse ways 
to enforce or otherwise vindicate legal norms that reflect the 
different ways in which economies are governed across different 
countries with divergent political economic models, legal traditions, 
and regulatory frameworks. Economically successful non-liberal or 
“coordinated” political economies not only rest on different 
institutional foundations and interest group configurations than 
liberal market economies, they also may develop institutionally 
rooted comparative advantages. These advantages induce broad 
resistance to reforms of areas as politically and economically sensitive 
as corporate governance and financial system regulation that might 
jeopardize these systemic strengths. In developing countries, 
constructing institutions of economic governance—be they 
regulatory agencies, courts, or private regulatory structures—with 
sufficient independence, competence, and integrity to carry out 
effective enforcement is one of the most difficult of political tasks, 
yet one of the most fundamentally important. This potential 
disjuncture between pro-shareholder legal reforms around the world 
and the difficulty of developing effective means of enforcing legal 
rules and shareholder rights points to a particularly serious problem 
for developing countries where legal institutions and the rule of law 
itself are weak.  
The global salience of law and legal reform in the areas of 
financial system and corporate governance reform leads to a deeper 
set of problems with the legal origins theory, and even to the 
impressive efforts to improve on the quantitative analysis of law, 
governance, and finance. Quantitative analyses can be of enormous 
use in identifying (and sometimes debunking) broad patterns of 
 
rules and role of institutional investors, the executive compensation practices, or 
reconsideration of legislative curbs on private litigation mechanisms). 
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political economic organization, legal structure, and economic 
development. On the other hand, they can also miss vitally important 
dimensions of how governance institutions develop and operate in 
particular political and social contexts. Perhaps inevitably, they 
present a formalist and functionalist conception of law and legal 
institutions that make them more amenable to operationalization 
and statistical analysis, but obscure how politics and legal practice 
determine the forms and functions at the base of the analysis. As one 
comparative legal scholar has remarked, “LLSV, for all their 
emphasis on legal origins, ultimately do not take the law seriously.”31 
The theoretical and analytical approaches of comparative law and 
comparative political economy can help fill in the lacunae of 
quantitative studies as represented by the legal origins literature.32  
IV. LEGAL ORIGINS AND LEGAL FAMILIES AS A PROBLEM OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 
The legal families at the conceptual foundation of the legal 
origins theory are problematic from the perspective of comparative 
legal theory. On the one hand, broad classificatory schemes such as 
the basic distinctions between common law and civil law systems, 
religious and secular law, and more jurisprudential and philosophical 
distinctions between positive law and natural law, are long-
established modes of comparison and analysis. They are quite 
deliberately constructed to simplify the intricacies of actual legal 
systems into more general categories that can be viewed as Weberian 
ideal types. Such categorizations render the particular more readily 
accessible and provide the conceptual bases for inferring and 
articulating generalizable theoretical and empirical propositions 
regarding law, legal systems, and their practical significance.33 On the 
other hand, the problem with such classifications is that they tend to 
reflect rather thin and formalistic conceptions of law as a set of 
 
 31. Ralf Michaels, The Second Wave of Comparative Law and Economics?, 59 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 197, 201 (2009). 
 32. For a review of LLSV urging greater incorporation of qualitative data and political 
analysis, see Peter A. Gourevitch, The Politics of Corporate Governance Regulation, 112 YALE 
L.J. 1829, 1857 (2003) (reviewing MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003)).  
 33. See Jaakko Husa, Legal Families and Research in Comparative Law, 1 GLOBAL 
JURIST ADVANCES 4 (2001) (citing MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1, 18–22 (1978)); 
DIRK KÄSLER, MAX WEBER: AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS LIFE AND WORK 180–84 (1988). 
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formal provisions and attributes that may tell us very little about how 
law and legal institutions develop and their practical significance in 
political and economic life. 
Legal family groupings suffer from the same reductionism of 
ideal-typic classification schemes that tend to sever macro-level 
theory and its generalizations from micro-level realities and 
analysis.34 Legal origins theory as developed by LLSV seeks to 
reconcile the macro- and micro-level dimensions of law through 
microeconomic theory and functionalist analysis.35 In the process, 
they tend to fall into the traps of functionalism and formalism. LLSV 
break down the relevant law of each country and assess it according 
to a set of universal juridical benchmarking categories which allow 
them to measure legal protection for shareholders.36 Once 
categorized, these categories are converted into variables for 
statistical analysis. LLSV classify the substantive law of different 
countries according to the dominant legal family on which the 
national legal system is based and score them with respect to these 
formalistic variables.37 For example, LLSV’s well-known and 
influential “anti-director rights index” is an aggregate measure of 
shareholder rights constructed with reference to six formal legal 
characteristics: (1) rights to mail-in proxy voting, (2) voting rights 
not constrained by share blocking (or mandatory deposit) rules, (3) 
cumulative voting or proportional representation rights, (4) 
oppressed minorities mechanisms, (5) preemptive rights, and (6) 
rights to call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting.38 The data 
 
 34. Of course, LLSV and those extending the legal origins theory perform a further step 
of simplification of legal systems and their characteristics through numerical operationalization. 
See Mathias M. Siems, Numerical Comparative Law: Do We Need Statistical Evidence in Law in 
Order to Reduce Complexity?, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 521, 533–38 (2005).  
 35. For an overview of LLSV’s legal origins theory and method, and a wide-ranging 
summary of the micro- and macro-economic empirical findings related to their claims, see 
generally Rafael La Porta et al., Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, supra note 1. 
 36.  Id. at 286. 
 37.  Id. at 286–87. 
 38. LLSV form the antidirector rights index  
by adding 1 when (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to 
the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the 
general shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation 
of minorities in the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities 
mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a 
shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 
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aggregated from the country cases is then analyzed to ascertain the 
correlations between legal family of origin and the level of 
shareholder rights and protections.39  
Variations in national-level shareholder rights and protections are 
statistically correlated with legal families of origin.40 Variations in 
legal protection for shareholders are also correlated with economic 
outcomes such as dispersed shareholding, ownership concentration 
and blockholding, returns to equity, and stock market 
capitalization.41 The legal categories of comparative analysis that 
produce the independent variables are justified by their effects on 
controlling agency costs within firm governance as predicted by 
economic theory. Not all aspects of legal systems are incorporated 
into the analytical framework. Nor are, for the most part, informal 
social relations nominally external to formal law. The criteria for 
inclusion are derived from microeconomic theory and principal-
agent theory in particular. Certain types of legal rules compiled into 
the “anti-director rights index” are deemed important and worthy of 
operationalization, quantification, and analysis because they are 
presumed to affect the function of law in reducing agency costs of 
shirking and opportunism.42 These reductions of agency costs are 
identified ex ante as likely to influence the behavior of individual 
market actors.43 This reliance on economic theory and the 
identification of specific types of legal rules incorporates aspects of 
formalist-functionalist approaches to comparative law into legal 
origins theory.44  
 
10 percent (the sample median), or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can 
be waived only by a shareholders’ vote.  
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 1, at 1122–23, tbl.1. An “[o]ppressed minorities 
mechanism” provides for “judicial venue to challenge the decisions of management or of the 
assembly or the right to step out of the company by requiring the company to purchase their 
shares when they object to certain fundamental changes . . . .” Id. at 1122, tbl.1. 
 39.  See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, supra 
note 1 (providing a summary and overview of literature). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See id. at n.3 and accompanying text. 
 44. Comparative law has long been both blessed and plagued by a profusion of 
theoretical schools and methodologies, each with their own strengths and weaknesses. Scholars 
frequently disagree as to what defines different theoretical approaches and despair of the 
incoherence of comparative law to the point of declaring it devoid of true theoretical content. I 
do not enter into these complex and arcane debates here. 
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The legal origins theory, like most economic theorizing, is 
deeply functionalist, and thus subject to the general critique of 
functionalism that has long been a staple of debate within 
comparative law.45 Functionalist accounts of law rest on a set of 
assumptions that have been fiercely criticized and contested by other 
theoretical approaches to comparative law. Functionalist theory 
presumes that “the legal system of every society faces essentially the 
same problems, and solves these problems by quite different means 
though very often with similar results.”46 The central question posed 
by the functional approach to comparative law is: “what legal norms, 
concepts or institutions in one system perform the equivalent 
functions performed by certain legal norms, concepts or institutions 
of another system?”47 Underlying this functionalism is the 
conception of law as not merely purposive, but fundamentally 
instrumental, as a means of accomplishing a priori specified ends.48 
The bias in instrumental-functionalist approaches to legal 
comparison favors the analysis and finding of similar or analogous 
features across legal systems, rather than difference and divergence. 
The latter tend to be screened out in favor of a homogenizing 
normative orientation with significant policy implications.49 In legal 
origins theory, the general categories of comparison are related to 
the common function of minority shareholder protection against 
rent-seeking by managers and controlling shareholders.50  
Differences enter the comparative analysis with respect to how 
well or poorly national legal systems embody given functional 
characteristics, yielding independent variables defined in formal legal 
terms, and how well they achieve the functional purpose of 
shareholder protection, as reflected by dependent variables 
 
 45. See Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 434–40 (1985); Jonathon Hill, Comparative Law, Law Reform and 
Legal Theory, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1989). 
 46. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 34 
(Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998). 
 47. W.J. Kamba, Comparative Law A Theoretical Framework, 23 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
485, 517 (1974). 
 48. See id. 
 49. Cf. Peer Zumbansen, Comparative Law’s Coming of Age? Twenty Years After 
Critical Comparisons, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1073, 1075–76 (2005) (discussing Frankenberg’s 
critique of functionalism as a perspective of false objectivity that obscures important 
dimensions of law and differences among legal systems). 
 50.  See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra, note 1, at 1120–21. 
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measuring quantitative outcomes in shareholder diffusion, stock 
market capitalization levels, equity financing, or other similar 
variables. As both a conceptual and practical matter, this is an 
indispensable form of analysis. Most of us are interested in what laws 
and regulations do, in addition to (and sometimes to the exclusion 
of) what they mean.51 Functionalism allows for the establishment of 
a basis for comparability of different variables and cases. It simplifies 
the analytical framework of comparison so that larger numbers of 
cases can be accommodated. In this sense, functionalism in 
comparative law is conducive, if not essential, to large-n statistical 
studies of legal phenomena. However, this mode of inquiry may veil 
as much as it explicates, in both normative and empirical terms.  
Framing functionality in terms of shareholder protection, let 
alone in terms of shareholder maximization, is neither normatively 
nor politically neutral. By so specifying the functional categories on 
which the comparative analysis is based, the legal origins literature 
has a potent normative and practical policy thrust consistent with the 
ideology and policy agenda of shareholder value.52 Even when LLSV 
describe legal families as historical legacies, their formalistic 
conception and operationalization of law and legal rules underlying 
the classificatory scheme militates against historical and political 
understanding of legal and institutional change. Seeking the 
objectivity of universal benchmarks, the approach dislocates legal 
systems, legal rules, and political economic arrangements from their 
temporal, political, sociological, and cultural contexts. The 
theoretical framework thus effectively depoliticizes the origins and 
course of development of a nation’s legal system.53 The “origins” of 
 
 51. Compare Frankenberg, supra note 45, with Zumbansen, supra note 49, at 1073–84 
(criticizing functionalism for denigrating or ignoring the meaning and informal dimensions of 
law in its social context).  
 52. For an excellent discussion of shareholder value as ideological tenet and policy goal, 
see William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for 
Corporate Governance, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 13 (2000). 
 53. As expressed by Günter Frankenberg in a brutal and classic formulation:  
The functionalist negates the interaction between legal institutions and provisions by 
stripping them from their systemic context and integrating them in an artificial 
universal typology of “solutions.” In this way, “function” is reified as a principle of 
reality and not taken as an analytical principle that orders the real world. It becomes 
the magic carpet that shuttles us between the abstract and the concrete, that 
transcends the boundaries of national legal concepts, that builds the system of 
comparative law, the “universal” comparative legal science or “the general law.” 
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national legal systems are reduced to a unitary and over-simplified 
assignation of predominant legal family—even where the foundations 
of national legal systems were imposed by an intermediating colonial 
power, as in the case of former Spanish dominions in Latin America 
designated as within the French legal family, or where they are the 
product of successive colonial powers or borrowings from a variety of 
legal traditions or families. The legal families at the base of the legal 
origins theory of law and finance are thus conceived and elaborated 
as historically given phenomena, yet, at least as presented in the work 
of LLSV,54 legal families and their diffusion are largely ahistorical. 
However, the legal systems and traditions that form the origins of 
legal families emerged in specific jurisdictions under particular 
political and economic conditions, and were thereafter 
geographically diffused, either through coercive imposition (usually 
through colonialism) or by voluntary appropriation from their source 
country to another.  
The use of formal legal categories as analytical tools or measures 
is often appropriate and useful, but such research methods and 
designs may screen out the historical and often intensely politicized 
processes of conflict, contestation, legal borrowing, and 
transplantation that determined the substance of these very 
categories in specific cases, processes that will continue to shape their 
development in the present and future. The development of legal 
systems, like that of states, unfolds over long periods of time, but the 
course of change often displays patterns of punctuated equilibrium 
or evolution. Political and economic change, crisis, and conflict are 
all ineradicably central to the dynamic of legal change and its effects 
on other dimensions of social organization and practice. Neither 
history nor politics can be treated so cavalierly as to become 
analytically epiphenomenal. Legal systems and bodies of law are 
often more accurately described as the products of bricolage, the 
recombination of borrowed elements appropriated from multiple 
legal traditions and systems, rather than direct lineal descendents of 
 
Frankenberg, supra note 45, at 440. With respect to LLSV and much law and economics 
scholarship, one might extend Frankenberg’s logic a step further to argue that reified 
categories that “transcend[] the boundaries of national legal concepts” are used to build a 
“universal” social science of general economic laws. Id.  
 54.  See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 1, at 1117–18. 
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originating legal “families.”55 (And this notion of bricolage, of 
course, does not fully engage the endogenous production of truly 
novel and innovative forms of legal and institutional change.) This is 
particularly so in domains such as securities regulation and corporate 
governance law. These overlapping areas of law are typically 
complex, nationally distinctive, and politically sensitive, yet are 
simultaneously exposed to increasing international market and 
political pressures. The regularity of financial crisis fosters waves of 
policy and legal change. The activities of transnational private 
organizations, ranging from markets to industrial firms and 
production networks, from financial institutions and markets to 
investment funds and shareholder advocacy groups, along with 
growth and increasing activities of multilateral institutions, create 
conditions that enable and intensify political and economic pressures 
for the diffusion of ideas and juridical concepts.56  
The combination of excess functionalism and formalism, such as 
that found in the legal origins theory, thus, may distort our 
understanding of how law and legal systems evolve, operate, and 
shape behavior in a given social or political setting. The functions 
fulfilled by legal rules and institutions are determined by political 
factors such as state institutional structure, interest group 
composition and alignments, partisan political conflict and 
competition, and by locally fashioned epistemic, ideological, and 
normative meanings of law. The purely instrumental economic 
effects of law are but one part of a much larger terrain in which law 
and its development are situated. As Peer Zumbansen notes,  
By stressing the production of “solutions” through legal 
regulations, the functionalist dismisses as irrelevant or does not 
even recognize that law also produces and stocks interpretive 
patterns and visions of life which shape people’s ways of organizing 
 
 55. See JOHN L. CAMPBELL, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION 69–74 
(2004) (developing a theory of institutional change through bricolage). Campbell’s theory of 
institutional change via bricolage does not explicitly address or seek to explain legal 
development, but the dynamic of appropriation and recombination lends itself particularly well 
to law where professionalization of jurists and transnational experience in legal practice often 
foster familiarity with and enable borrowing of foreign legal concepts and mechanisms.  
 56. See, e.g., Holly J. Gregory, The Globalization of Corporate Governance, Part 1, 
GLOBAL COUNSEL, 52 (Sept. 2000); Holly J. Gregory, The Globalization of Corporate 
Governance, Part 2, GLOBAL COUNSEL, 51 (Oct. 2000); cf. CAMPBELL, supra note 55, at 
163–67 (arguing that multilateral organizations have had limited effects on diffusion and 
implementation of neo-liberal ideas and policies).  
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social experience, giving it meaning, qualifying it as normal and just 
or as deviant or unjust.57 
Conversely, law as a discourse, institutional environment, and as a 
determinant of other political and economic institutional 
arrangements may constitute the meaning and alter the conduct of 
social, political, and economic activity.58  
Two further fundamental difficulties arise from comparative 
functionalism once law is considered as a component of a national 
political economic regime. First, the contextualization of law in 
divergent institutional and political contexts may result in legal rules 
fulfilling different or multiple functions that are simply not detected 
when using a conceptual approach and methodology that imposes 
uniform functional categories. What law means to actors in a 
particular social and institutional context may have a significant 
impact on what it does, i.e., the ways in which it shapes behavior.59 
Legal theory stretching back at least as far as legal realism and well 
represented in law and society scholarship on the “law in action” has 
long focused on precisely these kinds of issues.60 The analysis of the 
practical, cognitive, and ideological effects of law is thus a valuable 
part of what Theda Skocpol described as “the dialectic of meaningful 
actions and structural determinants.”61 However, such substantive 
and theoretical concerns typically favor the use of qualitative “thick 
description” or analytic narratives over quantitative analysis in order 
to discover how the embedding of law in social and institutional 
contexts influences the impact of law on the perceptions and 
behavior of individuals and groups.62  
 
 57. Zumbansen, supra note 49, at 1076 (citing Frankenberg, supra note 45, at 438). 
 58. See id.  
 59. Cf. Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, The “New Institutionalism,” and the 
Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89 (1988) (discussing the theoretical 
development of sociological institutionalism and its potential to integrate normative and 
structural understandings of social and political phenomena, including law).  
 60. Indeed, the seminal work of Berle and Means and J. Willard Hurst’s later pioneering 
socio-legal work on law and the rise of the large corporation can be seen as foundational to this 
theoretical perspective on law. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY 
OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1970). 
 61. Theda Skocpol, Sociology’s Historical Imagination, in VISION AND METHOD IN 
HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY 1, 4 (Theda Skocpol ed., 1984). 
 62. For two excellent examples of the use of analytical narratives in the study of 
comparative corporate governance, see GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 10 (employing a 
mixed methods approach using both analytical narratives and statistical analysis), and 
DO NOT DELETE 2/10/2010 12:48 PM 
1501 Legal Regimes and Political Particularism 
 1525 
Second, a legal rule, principle, or concept may reflect and 
reconcile conflicting norms that likewise may go undetected and 
otherwise be devalued by a simpler, more reductive functional 
analysis. Fiduciary duties in corporate law have a shareholder 
protection function, but also may embody managerialist 
understandings of corporate control. Likewise, labor 
codetermination laws in Germany and many other European 
countries not only serve a legitimizing function for private enterprise 
and the corporate form, but they also play a role in structuring the 
broader national labor relations and production systems.63 Other 
areas of corporate law, such as fiduciary obligations and rules 
governing board structure and meetings, may reflect the necessary 
normative and functional accommodation of labor representation on 
the supervisory board and on works councils that complicates the 
assignation of a specific function to parts of a complex legal 
framework. Codetermination law and other aspects of corporate law 
more generally may run counter to narrow short-term shareholder 
interests, but they may also serve efficiency enhancing ends. The 
legitimizing function served by protection of employee or other 
stakeholder interests may reduce potentially costly social and political 
conflict (or other more costly forms of government intervention into 
firm affairs).64 Likewise, given complementary institutional 
arrangements,65 such rules may help create comparative advantages in 
certain industries and markets.66 Functionalist analyses can address 
 
MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 10 (using a form of analytical narratives to present 
“institutional autopsies” of financial and corporate governance crises). 
 63.  See Kathleen Thelen, Why German Employers Cannot Bring Themselves to Dismantle 
the German Model, in UNIONS, EMPLOYERS, AND CENTRAL BANKS 138–69 (Torben Iversen, 
Jonas Pontusson & David Soskice eds., 2000). 
 64. See generally KATHLEEN A. THELEN, UNION OF PARTS: LABOR POLITICS IN 
POSTWAR GERMANY (1991); Wolfgang Streeck, Co-determination: After Four Decades, in 
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: STUDIES OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
IN ADVANCED CAPITALISM 137 (Wolfgang Streeck ed., 1992) [hereinafter Streeck, Co-
determination]. 
 65. Complementary institutions are those whose coupling makes them more 
economically efficient than either would be in isolation. See, e.g., Peter A. Hall & David 
Soskice, An Introduction to the Varieties of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, supra 
note 10, at 1. 
 66. This is a key claim of a large and influential body of comparative political economy 
scholarship. See, e.g., id.; Gregory Jackson, Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan: 
Liberalization Pressures and Responses During the 1990s, in THE END OF DIVERSITY? 
PROSPECTS FOR GERMAN AND JAPANESE CAPITALISM 261 (Kozo Yamamura & Wolfgang 
Streeck eds., 2003); Gregory Jackson, The Origins of Nonliberal Corporate Governance in 
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these sorts of complications in determining the roles law plays in 
social and economic life, but to do so they must view legal rules and 
institutions within their larger institutional and historical contexts. 
The irony underlying this treatment of law in the legal origins 
theory, and much functionalist analysis based on economic theory, is 
that along the way to concluding that law matters, the theoretical 
and analytical framework does not take law itself seriously.  
Law is a system of normative rules that is not only the product of 
the historical interplay of exogenous and endogenous political and 
economic forces, but constitutive of political and economic 
arrangements. Law and legal systems, if they are anything more than 
a formalistic Potempkin village of provisions without effective 
enforcement or compliance, have their own semi-autonomous 
internal logic that plays a significant role in constituting the 
institutional environment in which political and economic action 
occurs. The more robust the rule of law is in a given political system, 
the more important this constitutive role of law will be. Two 
implications flow from this observation. First, comparative law would 
benefit from approaches to the study of comparative political 
economy that focus on the institutional logic and historical 
development of complex political economic systems. The two fields 
naturally complement one another, but remain largely distinct and 
autonomous to the disadvantage of each. Second, countries and their 
legal systems must be distinguished for analytical purposes on the 
basis of their relative institutionalization and robustness of the rule of 
law before anything can be said regarding the effects of law on 
economic organization and other outcomes. These two subjects are 
discussed in the following sections.  
 
Germany and Japan, in THE ORIGINS OF NONLIBERAL CAPITALISM: GERMANY AND JAPAN IN 
COMPARISON 121, 169 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kozo Yamamura eds., 2001); Wolfgang Streeck, 
On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production, in BEYOND KEYNESIANISM: 
THE SOCIO-ECONOMICS OF PRODUCTION AND FULL EMPLOYMENT 21 (Wolfgang Streeck & 
Egon Matzner eds., 1991); Sigurt Vitols, Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing 
Germany and the UK, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 337. For an analysis of 
the role of legal norms and methods in underpinning different “varieties of capitalism,” see 
Katharina Pistor, Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market Economies (European 
Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 30, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=695763. 
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V. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LEGAL-
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Comparative political economy should have a deep affinity for 
comparative legal analysis. More specifically, the historical 
institutionalist school of comparative political economy has much to 
gain from comparative law.67 Unfortunately, law has not taken up 
the central position in the study of political and economic 
institutions that its role in social life would justify.68 Political science 
as a field has largely marginalized the study of law to its own 
periphery.69 Legal scholars can hardly avoid politics and routinely 
enrich their work with political analysis, but historical institutionalist 
theory and empirical work seldom influence the thinking and work 
of academic legal analysis.70 At least in advanced industrial 
economies, law plays an important role in ordering economic activity 
and constituting institutions—including the corporation—that shape 
the identities, interests, and strategies pursued by economic actors 
and groups. Indeed, one of the major contributions of the legal 
origins literature is the consistent argument that differences in legal 
 
 67. Historical institutionalism is a large and varied literature containing numerous 
conflicting theoretical approaches. For theoretical works summarizing historical 
institutionalism as a theoretical framework in comparative political economy, see CAMPBELL, 
supra note 55; STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE (Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen & Frank Longstreth eds., 1992); Coling Hay & 
Daniel Wincott, Structure, Agency, and Historical Institutionalism, 46 POL. STUD. 951, 951–
57 (1998); Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol, Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary 
Political Science, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 693 (Ira Katznelson 
& Helen V. Milner eds., 2002); Kathleen Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Politics, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 369 (1999). This literature also has a branch focused 
exclusively on the United States known as American political development. See generally 
KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT (2004). 
 68. For an earlier plea to incorporate law in institutionalist theory, see Smith, supra note 
59, at 89–108. Unfortunately, Smith’s proposed theoretical and research agenda was not 
widely embraced. 
 69. The sub-field of public law has been reduced, in the main, though not entirely, to 
the study of judicial behavior and the study of courts in policy areas. 
 70. For prominent exceptions integrating comparative political economy within legal 
scholarship, see Pistor, supra note 66; MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 10; Peer Zumbansen, 
Varieties of Capitalism and the Learning Firm: Corporate Governance and Labour in the 
Context of Contemporary Developments in European and German Company Law, 8 EUR. BUS. 
ORG. L. REV. 467 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=993910; Peer Zumbansen 
& Daniel Saam, The ECJ, Volkswagen and European Corporate Law: Reshaping the European 
Varieties of Capitalism, 8 GERMAN L.J. 1027 (2007). 
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rules produce significant variation in economic organization and 
outcomes.71  
Law also plays an important role in structuring politics in a 
multitude of ways and on multiple levels: constitutional law, 
legislation and statutory law, regulatory rule-making and processes, 
case law, and the roles and powers of courts and other adjudicatory 
bodies. Law is both the product of politics and part of the political 
machinery that produces it. This dual role makes law and regulation 
a vital component of the institutional arrangements that define much 
of the public and private spheres—and the relations between them. 
Disentangling the relationship between law as product and law as 
political architecture is at once difficult and necessary, and it is made 
more difficult, if not impossible, by ahistorical theories. Hence, a 
historically grounded approach to political analysis is particularly 
useful to the study of how law functions as part of the political 
economy. 
Historical institutionalism as a theoretical approach to the study 
of political economy represented a response by scholars during the 
1980s and 1990s to older theories of interest group politics and 
structural functionalism, as well as to some characteristics and 
currents of rational choice theory.72 From interest group theory, and 
later from rational choice theory, historical institutionalism 
appropriated the concepts of group competition for scarce resources, 
instrumental calculation, and strategic action.73 Structural 
functionalism contributed the conception that the polity and political 
economy are comprised of systematically interacting institutional 
components. The structural relations among these institutional 
features allocate power and resources asymmetrically, and thus 
privilege some groups over others in ways that contribute to 
distinctive trajectories of development over time.74 This aspect of 
structural analysis problematizes interests and preferences that form a 
 
 71.  See, e.g., La Porta et al., Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, supra note 1, at 
285–89. 
 72. For a classic summary of historical institutionalism, contrasting it with the rational 
choice and sociological variants of the “new institutionalism,” see Peter A. Hall & Rosemary 
C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 936 (1996). 
For an early statement of the intellectual and research agenda of historical institutionalism, see 
STRUCTURING POLITICS, supra note 66, at ix–xiii. 
 73. Hall & Taylor, supra note 72, at 937; see also THELEN, supra note 64, at 373–74 
(discussing the relationship between rational choice and historical institutionalism). 
 74. Hall & Taylor, supra note 72, at 937. 
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critical point of distinction between historical institutionalist theory 
and the assumptions of rational self-interest at the foundation of 
neo-classical economics. For historical institutionalists, interests and 
even interest group identities are the endogenous product of 
institutional arrangements, including legal and regulatory 
frameworks.75 Different groups form and their structure, scope, 
composition, and political and economic strength vary under 
divergent institutional and legal arrangements.76 The incentives and 
opportunity structures they face differ across institutional contexts 
and as a result of their internal differences.77  
As a consequence, actors and groups may want very different 
things from the political and legal systems. Actors and groups can 
seek to maximize many sorts of benefits—wealth, status, security—
and they can seek to maximize them over different time frames. 
Political and economic actors direct instrumental strategic action 
towards the pursuit of interests that have themselves been influenced 
by the legal and institutional environment that defines the available 
means to rationally pursue them (including group formation). Social 
values may play an important role in determining preferences within 
this universe of endogenous preferences, ideas and cultural norms. 
However, these subjective and contextually contingent interests may 
be pursued with ruthless and calculating efficiency appropriate to an 
institutional environment that privileges certain groups, interests, 
 
 75.  See CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER, supra note 10, at ch. 2; CAMPBELL, 
supra note 55, at 145–46, 174–75, 185–86. 
 76. See generally Hall and Taylor, supra note 72, at 937–41; Kathleen Thelen, Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 369–404 
(1999); STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE (Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth eds., 1992); PETER A. 
HALL, GOVERNING THE ECONOMY: THE POLITICS OF STATE INTERVENTION IN BRITAIN AND 
FRANCE 233, 276–80 (1986); Wolfgang Streeck and Phillipe C. Schmitter, Community, 
Market, State—and Associations? The Progressive Contribution of Interest Governance to Social 
Order, in PRIVATE INTEREST GOVERNMENT: BEYOND MARKET AND STATE 1, 1–29 (Wolfgang 
Streeck & Phillipe C. Schmitter eds., 1985); cf. Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In: 
Strategies of Analysis in Current Research, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 3–42 (Peter B. 
Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol eds., 1985); JOHN ZYSMAN, GOVERNMENTS, 
MARKETS AND GROWTH, chs. 1–2 (1983) (interests and adjustment strategies of private actors 
and groups shaped by institutionally-defined state capacities to develop and implement 
interventionist policies). 
 77.  See, e.g., Christine Mahoney, The Power of Institutions: State and Interest-Group 
Activity in the European Union, 5 EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS 441 (2004); Gary Marks & 
Doug McAdam, Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in the 
European Union, 19 W. EUR. POL. 249 (1996). 
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and strategies over others. The social and institutional environment 
of a competitive marketplace fosters and reinforces the form of 
rational self-interest and economistic utility maximization found in 
most economic theory. From this vantage point, the market order 
and its associated conceptions of norms and interests is a special case, 
rather than a universal description of the essential attributes of socio-
economic relations. In sum, institutions are inherently biased in their 
allocation of power and authority, the formation of interests, and 
their influence in constituting the normative appropriateness of 
behavior. Law tends to reinforce these biases by constituting or 
buttressing institutions.  
Institutions not only constitute and shape power relations, they 
are, of course, the historical products of political conflicts, bargains, 
and consensus that then tend to become path dependent. Law 
provides a particularly important example of both the historical 
processes of development and of path dependence. One of the 
primary values of a legal order is its relative stability, whether one 
describes that value in terms of making credible commitments, 
establishing functional organizational routines, or the protection of 
particularly important norms. The stability of the legal order derives 
from both power relationships and cognitive, or ideational, factors.  
First, legal rules and institutions mobilize bias.78 They tend to 
empower, structurally entrench, and often enrich certain groups over 
others. Legal structures thereby tend to secure their own persistence 
and reproduction by creating asymmetries of power that benefit 
groups with a material interest in maintaining legally legitimated and 
privileged access to state power to enforce their claims.  
For example, once corporate governance law tipped in favor of 
managerial interests in the late-nineteenth century United States (a 
consequence of American federalism and prevailing doctrines of 
constitutional law), managers had increased discretionary power over 
the resources of large corporate firms to reinforce their legally 
secured positions against both labor and holders of financial capital.79 
 
 78. Cf. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 65 (1960). Later institutionalist theory built on Schattschneider’s 
seminal formulation by focusing on the constitutive role of institutional arrangements on 
individual and group identities and interests. 
 79. See, e.g., ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS, supra note 10; ROE, 
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS, supra note 8; Roe, Political Theory, supra note 10; Roe, Some 
Differences in Corporate Structure, supra note 10. 
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Successive political backlashes against managerial insulation, most 
notably during the New Deal, the post-Watergate 1970s, and the 
post-Enron period of reform during the early to mid-2000s, only 
partially undermined or reversed these legal and institutional 
advantages in corporate governance, while pension and labor laws 
tended to reduce the threat these constituencies posed to the 
authority of managers.80 Conversely, where stakeholder governance 
became enshrined in law, as in Continental Europe and to some 
extent Japan, these arrangements, however incomprehensible to the 
general public in their myriad details, were substantially locked in by 
the interest group politics that corporate governance law informed 
and shaped.81 
Second, law is inherently normative and this has political and 
sociological ramifications. Law, at least in functional democratic 
political systems, is a repository of social values, or, to use Katarina 
Pistor’s term, “ground rules.”82 Where this is the case, the path 
dependence of law reflects not only the potentially pathological and 
dysfunctional lock-in effects of institutions, but the stability of a 
society’s underlying ideological commitments to identifiable 
normative understandings (and at times aspirations). Even in its 
driest most technical manifestations, and corporate governance law is 
in many respects dry and technical, it embodies not only the 
concretization of interest group bargaining and political 
 
 80. John W. Cioffi, Restructuring “Germany Inc.”: The Politics of Company and Takeover 
Law Reform in Germany and the European Union, 24 LAW & POL’Y 355 (2002); John W. 
Cioffi, The State of the Corporation: State Power, Politics, Policymaking, and Corporate 
Governance in the United States, Germany, and France, in TRANSATLANTIC POLICYMAKING IN 
AN AGE OF AUSTERITY: DIVERSITY AND DRIFT 253 (Martin A. Levin & Martin Shapiro eds., 
2004); John W. Cioffi, Building Finance Capitalism: The Regulatory Politics of Corporate 
Governance Reform in the United States and Germany, in THE STATE AFTER STATISM: NEW 
STATE ACTIVITIES IN THE AGE OF LIBERALIZATION 185 (Jonah Levy ed., 2006) [hereinafter 
Cioffi, Building Finance Capitalism]; John W. Cioffi, Corporate Governance Reform, 
Regulatory Politics, and the Foundations of Finance Capitalism in the United States and 
Germany, 7 GERMAN L.J. 533 (2006); Cioffi, Revenge of the Law?, supra note 30, at 60. 
 81. See, e.g., John W. Cioffi & Martin Höpner, The Political Paradox of Finance 
Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance 
Reform, 34 POL. & SOC’Y 463 (2006) [hereinafter Cioffi & Höpner, The Political Paradox of 
Finance Capitalism]; John W. Cioffi & Martin Höpner, Das Parteipolitische Paradox des 
Finanzmarktkapitalismus: Aktionärsorientierte Reformen in Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien 
und den USA [The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Shareholder Reform in Germany, 
France, Italy, and the USA], 47 POLITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT 419 (2006) (F.R.G.) 
[hereinafter Cioffi & Höpner, Political Paradox: Shareholder Reform]. 
 82. Pistor, supra note 66, at 2. 
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maneuvering, but implicit or explicit normative and ontological 
beliefs about the world.83 Once in place, legal rules tend to be 
invested with the imprimatur of the state and are often endowed 
with legitimacy by virtue of being legal.84 Stripping legal rules and 
principles out of their broader normative, institutional, and 
economic contexts inevitably defines them in the thinnest of terms 
and distorts their meaning and function through excessive 
abstraction and formalism. Law is placed outside of politics and 
history. Accordingly, its origins and the recursive processes of legal 
and institutional change are obscured along with law’s practical 
import. 
As noted above, our understanding of law and legal systems, 
especially in comparative perspective, benefits from greater historical 
grounding and an explicit recognition of the ways in which the 
regulatory effects of legal rules and norms are embedded in and 
informed by their social and institutional context. This kind of 
analysis, however, favors small-n qualitative studies richer in 
narrative, nuance, and detail than can be captured by large-n 
quantitative methods. Qualitative approaches to research and analysis 
may trade off the parsimonious elegance and claims to 
generalizability of well-designed statistical studies and economic 
models for a fuller description of how legal and political economic 
systems operate and develop, but the trade-off goes both ways. 
Large-n quantitative analysis suffers from its own problems, namely 
that “the more cases scholars include in a study, the less likely they 
are to grasp the full range of information pertinent to understanding 
 
 83. More prosaically, perhaps, the influence of law in creating incentives to form certain 
types of organizational structures, such as the publicly traded corporation, and to pursue 
specific economic strategies, such as financially-driven management and restructuring, reaches 
down indirectly yet deeply into the micro-level of individual and collective behavior. As 
theorized by scholars of organization theory and sociological institutionalism, personnel within 
complex bureaucratic organizations that develop in a given legal environment commonly 
routinize tasks and orient behavior to scripts and norms of appropriateness that tend to have 
considerable resilience in the absence of external disruption. For a review, see, for example, 
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS ch. 1 (Paul DiMaggio & Walter 
Powell eds., 1991). For an application to corporate management and governance, see NEIL D. 
FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL (1993).  
 84. For a brilliant empirical study elaborating on this self-legitimating character of law, 
see William Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1111 
(1989); see also WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR 
MOVEMENT (1991) (studying the impact of the courts and labor law on the evolution of 
American “business” unionism). 
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those cases.”85 It would be foolish to dispense with one mode of 
research and analysis or the other, but it is essential to understand 
their respective limitations.  
Studies can draw on both modes of inquiry to good effect, as a 
number of recent major works on comparative corporate governance 
have done. Mark Roe, for example, has combined political history, 
economic theories of principal-agent problems, and statistical analysis 
in elaborating his political theory of comparative corporate 
governance. He has focused on political conflicts between right and 
left parties and between labor and capital as the driving forces of 
structural change in law, finance, and ownership.86 Roe has argued 
that where the political left is politically strong, or where anti-
financier populism is both prevalent and empowered by the structure 
of the state, shareholders are unable to secure effective legal means 
to constrain rent-seeking by labor and managers.87 Shareholders thus 
tend to adopt blockholding strategies of control that impede the 
development of diffuse shareholding, the separation of ownership 
and control, and liquid securities markets.88 Under this analysis, law 
matters, but it serves as an intermediate, rather than as an 
independent, variable.  
Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn use a combination of large-n 
statistical techniques, institutional typologies of coordinated and 
liberal market economies appropriated from the “varieties of 
capitalism” literature, institutional theories of veto point politics, and 
qualitative analytical narratives to advance a coalitional theory of 
cross-national differences in corporate governance regimes.89 
Corporate governance law and regulation will vary cross-nationally—
and change over time—depending on the interest group or interest 
group coalition that prevails in political struggle over corporate 
governance policy and lawmaking.90 Where shareholders are 
 
 85. Gregory J. Kasza, Quantitative Methods: Reflection on the Files of Recent Job 
Applicants, in PERESTROIKA! THE RAUCOUS REBELLION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 421, 425 
(Kristen Renwick Monroe ed., 2005); see also Siems, supra note 34, at 521–40 (cautioning that 
statistical analysis of law and legal institutions is subject to substantial error and 
incompleteness). 
 86. See, e.g., ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS, supra note 8. 
 87. Id. at 1–5. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 10. 
 90. See id. at 23, 59–67, tbls.2.3 & 4.1. 
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politically victorious, either alone (rather unlikely) or in alliance with 
managers or labor, they are likely to secure policies and laws 
conducive to securities market development and the dispersion of 
shareholding into the classic Berle-Means separation of ownership 
and control.91 Where shareholders lose to an alliance of labor and 
managers, for example, a bank-centered financial system will likely 
persist and shareholding is once again likely to remain concentrated 
in blockholding patterns within a “corporatist compromise” 
underlying the coordinated market economies identified by the 
varieties of capitalism literature.92 These interest group alignments 
and their respective interests vary cross-nationally, and these 
differences are powerfully shaped by the legacies of institutional 
arrangements within the state, firm, and markets.93  
Yves Tiberghien employs both statistical measures of bureaucratic 
autonomy and process tracing to explain the politics of corporate 
governance reform in response to the globalization of financial 
markets and capital flows.94 This framework focuses even more on 
the political and policy-making agency of state actors, and thus relies 
on structural characteristics of state bureaucracies (and thus to some 
extent on cross-national differences in public law) in explaining the 
character and extent of pro-shareholder reforms. The ability to 
successfully reform corporate governance and financial market 
regulation is substantially determined by the institutional insulation 
of bureaucrats from short-term political pressures.  
These studies are noteworthy in the ways they depart from 
and/or supplement statistical methodology and microeconomic 
theory that characterizes the legal origins literature. They implicitly 
or explicitly problematize the transparency, rigor, and precision of 
numbers in the study of something so complex, socially embedded, 
and often maddeningly ambiguous as law. These problems do crop 
up in the legal origins literature, most directly in the problems of 
quantification of its core legal and institutional variables as pointed 
out by a number of critics. Yet, this means that the legal origins 
literature tends to be analytically limited by the time-bound 
correlational snapshots it produces of complex and dynamic legal and 
 
 91. See id. at 61–63, tbls.2.3 & 4.1. 
 92. Id. at 64–65. 
 93. Id. at 28–29, 284–85. 
 94. See TIBERGHIEN, supra note 10. 
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economic systems.95 The political economy approaches to the subject 
of corporate governance mentioned above grapple in their own way 
with the important problem of stability and change, which, in an age 
of reform and political economic crisis, is a matter of preeminent 
concern.  
VI. LEGAL ORIGINS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PATH 
DEPENDENCE AND REFORM 
Theorization of the “stickiness” or path dependence of 
institutional arrangements, which may include legal and regulatory 
structures, is one of the strengths and accomplishments of the “new 
institutionalisms” in economics, political science, and sociology, but 
it is also one of their weaknesses.96 Though recent scholarship has 
sought to address the problem of institutional and policy 
development,97 much institutionalist theory and analysis is far more 
compelling as a way to explain stability than change. Likewise, legal 
origins theory, despite its exceedingly thin conception of law and 
institutions, is deeply and profoundly path dependent. Some of the 
developmental paths implicit in its attention to the colonial roots of 
many national legal systems stretch back for centuries. Path 
dependence is important to the study of political, legal, and 
economic phenomena, but it is not eternal or over-determining.  
The path dependence of the LLSV contention that legal origins, 
often in the distant past, determine current states of financial 
development and corporate ownership patterns yields two distinct 
weaknesses. First, without historical grounding, LLSV are left with 
correlations without convincing mechanisms of causation to buttress 
their claims. Second, to some extent LLSV were historically unlucky. 
Just as they began to publish their work on the effects of legal 
origins, a wave of corporate governance and securities law reforms 
swept much of the world. If national corporate governance regimes 
 
 95. Capturing longer-term developmental trends and dynamics poses extraordinarily 
difficult problems of data gathering and quality that must be overcome before engaging in 
credible longitudinal and time-series analysis. Given extant controversies over data and 
operationalization within the legal origins literature, and the decline in the availability and 
quality of historical data going back in time, many of these problems are unlikely to be resolved 
satisfactorily.  
 96. See Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms, 44 POLITICAL STUDIES 936 (1996). 
 97. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 55. 
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and their legal components are so deeply path dependent, how could 
they have changed so quickly, over so much of the world, and in 
some cases repeatedly? In short, what we know of the recent and 
more distant history of financial systems and corporate capitalism 
casts doubt on LLSV’s causal claims concerning the long-term 
influence of legal families.  
In their article, The Great Reversals, Raghuram Rajan and Luigi 
Zingales advanced one of the most devastating critiques of the legal 
origins theory and its findings.98 Rajan and Zingales note that in 
1913 the major national economies in Continental Europe were far 
more financially developed than the United States (as measured by 
bank deposits and stock market capitalization as a percentage of 
GDP, share issues, and number of listed firms).99 The traumatic 
economic shocks and upheavals of the two World Wars and 
especially the Great Depression triggered a political process of 
financial autarky that tightly constrained international capital flows 
and repressed financial market activities in order to create the 
structural conditions necessary to develop broad welfare state social 
insurance programs.100 The post-war Bretton Woods monetary 
regime then institutionalized and entrenched this semi-closure of 
financial systems and sustained the broad trend towards social 
democracy across most of the industrialized countries.101 However, 
this transformation of the international economy and the political 
economies of the industrialized countries that fashioned it does not 
explain the variation across countries even during this period. From 
1929 to 1980, the once robust financial markets and equity-driven 
finance of most civil law European countries and Japan contracted, 
while they rebounded in the common law-based United States and 
the United Kingdom. Rajan and Zingales attribute this divergence in 
post-war financial development to the greater state-sanctioned 
cartelization of finance during the period owing to the relative ease 
of regulatory capture of more centralized states.102 Only the 
 
 98. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 5. 
 99. Id. at 6–9. 
 100. Id. at 37–38. 
 101. Though they note that Keynes was among the architects of the Bretton Woods 
regime, Rajan and Zingales do not discuss the importance of the fact that the closure of 
national financial markets also facilitated policies of Keynesian demand management by 
removing the threat of capital flight in response to inflationary policies. Id. at 38–39. 
 102. Id. at 42–43.  
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breakdown of the original Bretton Woods system unleashed market 
forces that would erode these domestic cartels and state controls on 
finance and spur the belated development of financial markets 
around the world.103 
In this telling, the role of law—and legislation in particular—
remains somewhat ambiguous, but its most salient function and 
effect is the repression of market finance. This would still make law 
and regulation an important subject in the study of financial 
development and corporate governance regimes.104 The focus of 
theory and research shifts from seeking to demonstrate why common 
law systems arguably have fostered the growth of securities markets 
and the dispersion of shareholding, to explaining how and why so 
many non-common law systems developed in ways that thwarted 
these developments.105  
However, this leads to an objection to the Rajan and Zingales 
analysis. They appear to naturalize the Berle-Means firm and large, 
highly liquid securities markets. Absent the pernicious efforts of 
would-be private sector rent-seekers, governments, and state 
bureaucrats, this is how capitalist economies will develop. However, 
that capitalist economies will naturally or spontaneously develop the 
Berle-Means paradigm is unlikely and implausible. There are too 
many agency problems and too much volatility in the liberal market 
financial and corporate governance model to cavalierly declare it to 
be a natural outcome of market processes. This suspicion is 
supported by the fact that liberalizing legal reforms and the epochal 
growth of international financial markets during the past twenty to 
thirty years have not necessarily transformed many national financial 
systems and/or corporate governance practices.  
It would also be an astonishing coincidence that most countries 
did not develop the liberal market paradigm. Unless the liberal 
market model is both natural and extremely fragile (which may be 
plausible in light of the financial crises of the past two decades and 
especially after the events of 2007–2009), Rajan and Zingales’s 
analysis requires us to believe that all these countries successfully 
repressed the natural course of capitalist development. 
 
 103. Id. at 43. 
 104. Cf. id. at 41 (checks on policymaking by independent courts have a significant 
influence on regulatory and financial developments in the United States). 
 105. Id. at 42–43. 
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Regardless of the merits of the political explanation Rajan and 
Zingales offer for these outcomes,106 their empirical findings pose a 
direct challenge to the legal origins theory. The logic of the LLSV 
argument is that legal origins set the basic structure of law and legal 
institutions in countries to which foreign legal families are exported, 
and that these structures continue to exercise a consistent influence 
on the law-taker countries’ financial and corporate governance 
systems. This presumes that the countries of legal origin and 
destination have similar financial orders soon after the period of legal 
system transplantation (i.e., weak financial markets, little equity 
finance, and few publicly traded firms). Feeble financial markets and 
shareholder rights at the time of origin result in feeble markets and 
protections decades (or centuries) later. However, Rajan and 
Zingales marshal compelling evidence that, in the early 
twentiethcentury, Germany and France, two of the leading legal 
sources for the diffusion of their respective legal families, had highly 
developed market-driven finance systems, as did Japan (which 
appropriated much of the German legal model).107 This finding 
appears to directly contradict the logic of path dependence on which 
the legal origins thesis rests, and suggests the need for an alternative 
political explanation for cross-national and inter-temporal 
variation.108  
A second serious empirical challenge to the path dependent logic 
of the legal origins theory is that there have been striking trends in 
corporate governance reform around the world over the past two 
 
 106. Rajan and Zingales argue, albeit rather tentatively, that decentralized law making 
through judge-made law and precedent characteristic of common law countries was less prone 
to capture than more centralized legislative functions of civil law systems. See id. at 42–43. This 
argument is unpersuasive. Even if state policymaking was captured by financial interests in 
Western Europe and Japan in the post-1929 or post-1945 period, that has nothing to do with 
the decentralization of common law rule formation. The post-war era witnessed the rise of the 
administrative state and regulatory bureaucracies in all these countries which could and 
regularly did override common law rules and doctrines. Some other political explanation is 
necessary to explain the outcomes.  
 107. Id. at 14–16, 39–41. 
 108. A number of scholars have attempted to develop political explanations of cross-
national variation in financial system and corporate governance structures. See, e.g., ROGER M. 
BARKER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, COMPETITION, AND POLITICAL PARTIES: EXPLAINING 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHANGE IN EUROPE (forthcoming Jan. 2010); CIOFFI, PUBLIC 
LAW AND PRIVATE POWER, supra note 10; GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 10; ROE, 
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS, supra note 8; TIBERGHIEN, supra note 10.  
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decades.109 Encompassing changes in both securities and company 
law, corporate governance reforms have consistently favored the 
expansion of shareholder rights and protections in securities 
regulation and corporate law. Corporate governance law and 
regulation across the major industrialized countries have undergone 
substantial re-regulation, reflecting efforts by political and economic 
elites to foster the development of domestic financial markets, 
financial services, and market-driven economic restructuring 
beginning at the firm level.110 This is consistent with Rajan and 
Zingales’s finding of increased market development after the early 
1980s and arguably demonstrates a contemporary “great reversal”—
at least in law and regulation.111  
Once again, these developments undermine the legal-empirical 
premises and path dependent logic of the legal origins theory. 
Established legal structures and traditions do not appear to have 
 
 109. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A 
SURVEY OF OECD COUNTRIES (2004) (reviewing trends in corporate governance reform, 
particularly after the Enron-era corporate scandals and stock market crashes). 
 110. See generally TIBERGHIEN, supra note 10; Cioffi, Building Finance Capitalism, 
supra note 80 (comparing contemporary reform and the emergence of “finance capitalism” in 
the United States and Germany); Cioffi & Höpner, Political Paradox: Shareholder Reform, 
supra note 81; Cioffi & Höpner, The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism, supra note 81 
(examining center-left political parties’ increased emphasis on corporate governance reform in 
Germany, France, Italy, and the United States); John W. Cioffi, Governing Globalization? The 
State, Law, and Structural Change in Corporate Governance, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 572 (2000) 
(describing cross-national trends in the development of corporate governance regimes in the 
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan). 
 111. In many countries, changes in market development, shareholder dispersion, and 
proportions of publicly traded corporations have not been commensurate with the degree of 
legal change. This gap between legal change and economic change may also undermine, or at 
least require modification of, the law matters thesis and the presumption that Berle-Means 
corporations, large stock markets, and high levels of equity finance are economically optimal. 
Law may still matter—a lot—as an enabling factor in the market-led transformation of finance 
and corporate governance, but only as part of broader institutional arrangements of the 
national, and increasingly the international, political economies. In some countries with non-
liberal forms of political economic organization, the broader institutional arrangements create 
comparative advantages that are inconsistent with these characteristically liberal market 
financial and corporate forms. See Hall & Soskice, supra note 65, at 1; Peter A. Hall & Daniel 
Gingerich, Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Macroeconomy: 
An Empirical Analysis (Max Planck Inst. for the Study of Societies, Discussion Paper 04/5, 
2004). Thus, even when controlling for cyclical market conditions, they experience at best 
modest change when laws are changed to encourage equity investment and stock market 
development. Further, this great reversal in favor of markets and shareholders has now entered 
a period of profound uncertainty as it confronts the grim realities of the global financial crisis 
that emanated from the United States beginning in 2007 and gained catastrophic momentum 
in 2008.  
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constrained reform in countries where we would have least expected 
them according to the legal origins theory. Common law and civil 
law countries and countries from all legal families have participated 
to a significant degree in this wave of pro-market and pro-
shareholder reforms. Even if the legal origins theory had some 
explanatory power with respect to past cross-national variations in 
corporate governance law, those national legal frameworks have been 
substantially transformed in many cases. Whether or not the legal 
origins theory held through the 1980s or early 1990s becomes a 
largely academic question; proliferating legal change calls the lasting 
effects of legal families into question, while also continuously 
undermining the current accuracy of LLSV’s coding of legal 
variables.  
If the path dependence logic of the legal origins theory is 
rejected, the question is once again raised: does law matter? The 
answer is probably a qualified yes, though the question must be 
approached and answered differently depending on if it is directed at 
the developed or developing countries. In the advanced industrial 
countries, where the rule of law is firmly established and legal 
institutions are well-developed and capacious, law almost certainly 
“matters” to economic organization, practices, and outcomes 
(though it likely matters and functions in ways that depart from the 
simple and straightforward principal-agent, transaction costs theories 
underlying the legal origins literature). In the less developed 
countries, where the rule of law, legal institutions, and state capacity 
are typically much weaker, differences in legal origins may well 
correlate with some significant variations in finance, corporate 
ownership, and economic outcomes, but these differences are more 
likely the consequences of the political and institutional legacies of 
colonialism, rather than variation in legal families or even 
contemporary legal rules.112  
 
 112. I do not address cases in which foreign law was copied or appropriated in whole or 
in part as a voluntary policy choice by the adoptive country. The politics of legal and economic 
development, such as in Japan’s purported adoption of German law in the nineteenth century, 
are not comparable to the colonial experience and cannot be analyzed in the same terms.  
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VII. RULE OF LAW, COLONIAL LEGACIES, AND LEGAL ORIGIN AS 
POLITICAL PROXY: THE DEVELOPED-DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
DISTINCTION 
A serious methodological problem of the legal origins theory is 
the analytical treatment of developed and undeveloped countries in 
the same manner. A central logical contradiction emerges as a result: 
LLSV find that law matters where there is little or no effective law. If 
this is not simply some spurious statistical artifact, the correlation 
suggests that the relationship between legal families and economic 
outcomes is not the causal effects of legal rules on behavior and 
organization, but one of legal history serving as a proxy for some 
other political characteristics that have a more direct influence on 
financial development and forms of corporate governance. 
Developing countries are particularly important for the legal origins 
literature, not only because of the vital practical significance of 
economic development, but also because of the relationship between 
developing countries and legal families in LLSV’s research design. 
Seeking to avoid endogeneity problems, the legal origins theory 
looks to the legal systems of developing countries in the post-
colonial era as examples of exogenous imposition.  
Thus, if developing countries are not truly comparable to the 
developed countries, and in particular the countries that exported 
their legal systems via colonial expansion, LLSV have not addressed 
the endogeneity problem they set out to solve. Rather than solving 
that problem, they have created another and arguably more serious 
methodological problem of comparing proverbial apples and 
oranges. If the legal origins theory cannot adequately measure and 
control for rule of law issues, the validity of the resultant empirical 
work is undermined. After all, one of the impressive and attractive 
features of the LLSV body of work is its comprehensiveness. It 
covers an at times astonishing number of country cases. However, if 
the methods used are not reliable to analyze the rule of law, and thus 
the role of law, in many developing countries suffering from 
pervasive and serious state incapacity and corruption, then the 
aggregate statistical findings decline in reliability as well. Even if the 
theory and analysis would work for country cases with more 
developed industrialized political economies and better 
institutionalized legal systems, there are relatively few rich “mother” 
countries covered in the studies and many more developing countries 
among their more problematic putative offspring.  
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The necessity of addressing issues of enforcement in any analysis 
of the effects and efficacy of law leads LLSV to include control 
variables concerning the quality of government and legal 
institutions.113  
Both the current quality of government, including the judiciary, 
and its inverse, corruption and state inefficiency, must be 
incorporated into the analysis if the measures are to be anything 
more than an exercise in formalism. The imposition (or in a number 
of cases voluntary adoption) of a legal system based on a foreign 
legal family is an element of the political history of a country and 
according to LLSV their findings established it as an important 
one.114 Politics and history enter into the analytical framework 
through the side door, so to speak, into a theory that is essentially 
non-political and not well suited to explain how or why states came 
to differ in their competence, effectiveness, and integrity.  
There are two fundamental problems with this approach. First, 
the rule of law, quality of institutions, and even corruption are 
notoriously imprecise and slippery concepts. Fierce, and likely 
endless, debates revolve around the rule of law as a concept, norm, 
and measure.115 Likewise, governmental quality is inherently difficult 
to conceptualize, assess, and quantify. Normative disagreement over 
what constitutes quality in public governance complicates the task of 
conceptualization. The extraordinary complexity of state functions, 
even restricting the inquiry to legal and regulatory activities directly 
related to corporate governance, pose daunting measurement 
problems.116 As Mathias Siems has noted, quoting Albert Einstein no 
less, scholars of comparative law should “[m]ake everything as simple 
 
 113. See La Porta et al., Investor Protection, supra note 1, at 1154–58. Earlier articles raise 
a number of political questions in conceptual and historical terms. See La Porta et al., Quality 
of Government, supra note 1; La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, supra note 1 
(shifting the focus of the legal origins analysis from corporate law to securities regulation). 
 114.  See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 1, at 1118–19, 1126. 
 115. See Stephan Haggard, Andrew MacIntyre, & Lydia Tiede, The Rule of Law and 
Economic Development, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 205 (2008) (review of different conceptions 
and measures of the rule of law and the problems they pose for empirical and quantitative 
analysis). Haggard et al. note that beyond disputes over the conceptualization of the rule of 
law and its relationship to formal state institutions, informal social institutions and norms also 
often inform the meaning and robustness of the rule of law in practice. Id. at 221–22. This 
further complicates the problems of conceptualization and empirical analysis. 
 116. For a critique and partial defense of quantitative methodology applied to law and 
governance, see Siems, supra note 34. 
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as possible, but not simpler.”117 It is not surprising, therefore, that 
the critiques of LLSV’s measures have focused on their coding and 
metrics for specific substantive and procedural rules in different 
countries, but have largely avoided the bramble bushes of state 
capacity and integrity, along with the strength of the rule of law.  
Second, leaving aside governmental competence, capacity, and 
efficiency, corruption (often used as a proxy for measuring strength 
of the rule of law) is both an extremely serious problem in 
developing (or non-developing) countries and it is by its nature 
largely hidden from view. Participants are hardly eager to disclose the 
extent or means of their corruption.118 Hence, metrics of quality of 
government are based on survey data based on subjective impressions 
of corruption, transparency, adjudication, and enforcement.119 
 
 117. Id. at 521. 
 118. If they were, this would raise the interesting philosophical and jurisprudential 
question of whether this activity is properly considered corrupt as opposed to an accepted, 
though ultimately destructive and inefficient, form of governance. Cf. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., 
BRIBES: THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF A MORAL IDEA, at xiii–xiv (1984). See generally 
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978) 
(premising corruption on a cultural and moral distinction between public and private spheres). 
Noonan writes:  
One society may be uncensorious of most reciprocities with its officeholders; there 
may be no legal response to them at all, and the appearance will be given of integrity 
everywhere. A different society may define bribes, legislate against bribetakers, and 
prosecute bribery in such a way as to suggest that the crime is ubiquitous.  
NOONAN, supra, at xiii. He goes on to note that “What is a bribe depends on the cultural 
treatment of the constituent elements. The observer outside the culture, like the cynic or 
rigorist within it, is inclined to see the conventional differences as arbitrary and to reduce all 
reciprocities of a given kind to bribes . . . .” Id. at xiii. He therefore warns against 
“reductionism that eliminates conventions and looks only at function.” Id. at xiv. As 
understandable as this plea for cultural sensitivity is, corruption often does have grave 
functional consequences for societies in which it becomes deeply rooted and prevalent, as 
suggested by Douglas North’s diagnosis of an all-too-common suboptimal equilibrium of 
societies mired in extractive and predatory economic activity that inhibits development. See 
DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
(1990). 
 119. The literature on conceptual and measurement issues with respect to corruption, 
rule of law, and governance is large and rapidly growing in keeping with the increasing policy 
and academic interest in public governance. See, e.g., CHRISTIANE ARNDT & CHARLES OMAN, 
USES AND ABUSES OF GOVERNANCE INDICATORS (2006); MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES 
OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, POWER AND DEMOCRACY (2005); JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF, 
THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION AND REFORM: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND 
POLICY (2007); Nick Duncan, The Non-Perception Based Measurement of Corruption: A 
Review of Issues and Methods from a Policy Perspective, in MEASURING CORRUPTION 131 
(Charles J.G. Sampford ed., 2006); Michael Johnston, Measuring the New Corruption 
Rankings: Implications for Analysis and Reform, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS AND 
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Perhaps this is the best we can do in grappling with the inevitable 
opacity of deliberately concealed social practices, but it yields a 
degree of uncertainty that is problematic in a variable so crucial to 
the quantitative analysis of law’s effects and efficacy in the context of 
a developing country.120  
From the perspective of comparative institutional analysis, to 
which the study of law can contribute much, the problems in 
assessing the status of the rule of law, and levels of corruption and 
state institutional capacity are stark. The “new institutionalisms” that 
have had a powerful influence on the disciplines of economics, 
political science, and sociology made substantial strides in including 
informal norms, practices, and routines within their theoretical 
frameworks. However, when corruption, state incapacity, or public 
sector inefficiency so degrades governmental efficacy along with 
levels of trust within society and the polity, the value of using formal 
institutions—including those of law and regulation—as variables or 
indicators decays as well. The rule of law presumes a distinction 
between public and private, not only in theory but in practice. Yet 
corruption represents the blurring of that line as private interests use 
the state to appropriate rents. These conditions erode or destroy the 
formal characteristics of the rule of law, and thus call into question 
 
CONTEXT 865 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer & Michael Johnston eds., 2001); Johann Graf 
Lambsdorff, Measuring Corruption—The Validity and Precision of Subjective Indicators: (CPI), 
in MEASURING CORRUPTION, supra, at 81; Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo 
Mastruzzi, Measuring Corruption: Myths and Realities, DEV. OUTREACH, Sept. 2006, at 124, 
available at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corecourse2007/ 
Myths.pdf; Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones, Daniel Kaufmann & Mark A. Schankerman, 
Measuring Governance, Corruption and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the 
Business Environment in Transition Economies, (World Bank Pol’y Research Working Paper 
No. 2312, 2000); Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters 
IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004, (World Bank Pol’y Research Working Paper No. 
3630, 2005); Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III: 
Governance Indicators for 1996-2002, (World Bank Pol’y Research Working Paper No. 3106, 
2003); Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Pablo Zoido-Lobatón, Aggregating Governance 
Indicators (World Bank Pol’y Research Working Paper No. 2195, 1999); Dilyan Donchev & 
Gergely Ujhelyi, What Do Corruption Indices Measure? (Aug. 13, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1124066). For empirical evaluations of 
rule of law reform programs and analyses of the conceptual and methodological issues 
involved, see BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF 
LAW (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003). 
 120. See Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law: The Case of the 
Doing Business Project, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1095 (2007) (critically analyzing the World 
Bank metrics of rule of law and quality of governance).  
DO NOT DELETE 2/10/2010 12:48 PM 
1501 Legal Regimes and Political Particularism 
 1545 
the validity and utility of legal variables in explaining patterns of 
economic behaviors and outcomes.  
Likewise, the rule of law presumes that legal rules can be and are 
reasonably well-enforced, but enforcement is generally practically 
unavailable or ineffective where corruption is rife and where state 
institutional capacities have collapsed or remain undeveloped. 
Understanding political and economic practices and behavior under 
such conditions may require theoretical and methodological 
approaches that focus on the informal, rather than formal, attributes 
of social life, such as the prevalence of clientalism inside the state and 
out, the structure of patron-client networks, and the forms and 
extent of state capture. “Grand corruption”121 is often (if not 
typically) organized and therefore may be accurately described, at 
least in some cases, as institutionalized. Although this framing of 
corruption may carve out a continued and useful role for 
institutional analysis, it diminishes the import of law as a constraint 
on public and private behavior that is at the conceptual foundation 
of the legal origins theory.  
The twin problems of corruption and enforcement provide a 
warning that developed and undeveloped countries often cannot be 
treated analytically in the same way. Their differences in institutional 
capacities and resources are simply too vast; their problems not only 
vary in degree and scale, but in kind.122 Those who believe law 
matters for political economic developments had best concern 
themselves with how to establish the rule of law in the first place—
 
 121. “‘Grand’ corruption refers to malfeasance of considerable magnitude by people who 
exploit their positions to get rich (or become richer)—political or business leaders.” Eric M. 
Uslander, Dep’t Gov’t & Politics, Univ. Md.–College Park, The Bulging Pocket and the Rule 
of Law: Corruption, Inequality, and Trust, Conference Paper Presented at “The Quality of 
Government: What It Is, How to Get It, Why It Matters,” The Quality of Government 
Institute, Department of Political Science, Göteborg University, Göteborg, Sweden 53 (Nov. 
17–19, 2005), available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/uslaner/uslanerbulging 
pocketgoteborg.pdf. 
 122. For a comprehensive review of the empirical and theoretical literature on corruption, 
law, and development, see ERIC M. USLANDER, CORRUPTION, INEQUALITY, AND THE RULE 
OF LAW: THE BULGING POCKET MAKES THE EASY LIFE (2008). Uslander argues persuasively 
that corruption takes root in conditions of high inequality that favor the emergence of 
clientalism, and that its corrosive effect on institutional integrity and social trust perpetuates 
inequality and thus corruption. Id. at 23–75. Less developed countries therefore face dilemmas 
distinct from those of industrialized countries. See id. at 180–213. They are often caught in a 
trap of mutually reinforcing inequality, corruption, and poverty. If they could develop 
economically they might have the resources to redress inequality and escape corruption’s grip, 
but corruption hinders institutional and economic development. Id. at 246–48. 
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and this turns attention back towards politics and institutions. 
Stephan Haggard, Andrew MacIntyre, and Lydia Tiede state the 
political and institutional foundations of the rule of law succinctly: 
[P]roperty rights and the integrity of contract are not simply the 
result of “getting the law right” in any narrow sense. Rather, 
property rights come out of a complex causal chain that includes a 
variety of complementary institutions and political bargains—with 
respect to security, appropriate checks on private capture of the 
state, institutional checks on state power, and the more discrete 
features of the judicial and legal system. In simplest form: Property 
rights and contracting rest upon institutions, but these in turn rest 
upon deep coalitions of consenting interests.123 
It follows that legal rules, let alone legal systems, cannot be imported 
or copied in some simple straightforward fashion.124 A disturbing 
implication can be drawn from this acknowledgement of the 
importance of politics to the development and functioning of 
institutions, and institutions to the establishment and maintenance of 
the rule of law. Where the appropriately constitutive politics and/or 
institutions are lacking, the rule of law remains an abstraction. 
Consequently, the developing and undeveloped countries may be on 
fundamentally different developmental trajectories. The developed 
countries are able to draw on their greater state and legal capacities 
and parlay them into greater capacities for successful reform and 
adaptive change. If developing countries remain mired in corruption 
and underdevelopment, it is increasingly unlikely that this is because 
of their membership in a given legal family, if it ever was. 
The seemingly intractable problems of many developing 
countries do not render comparative law irrelevant, but they do 
illustrate the need to integrate the comparative legal, historical, and 
political analysis in the study of economics and institutions. The 
perspectives of comparative political economy and comparative law 
are both essential to advance our understanding of governance and 
economic organization. This is just as true of the developing world 
where there is often a dearth of functional institutions and legal 
 
 123. Haggard et al., supra note 115, at 221. Haggard et al. provisionally simplify the rule 
of law to the “core” of property and contract rights for purposes of their discussion of its 
irreducibly political origins. Id. at 206–09, 221. 
 124. Id. at 221 (citing Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, in 
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD 75 (Thomas Carrothers ed., 2006)). 
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development as it is of the advanced industrial countries with well-
established institutional structures and legal systems. The legal 
origins literature initiated an exploration of important patterns of 
legal, institutional, and economic development. We are left with a 
puzzle. If legal families are not as determinative of economic 
outcomes as the LLSV path dependence account suggests, what are 
they measuring and what explains the variations across developed 
and undeveloped countries?  
VIII. LEGAL ORIGIN AS POLITICAL PROXY? 
Given the current state of our knowledge, this essay ends on a 
speculative note. The theoretical and empirical critiques of the legal 
origins theory have substantially undermined their claims. One 
possible answer to the question of what LLSV are measuring is that 
they are not measuring anything and that the conceptual, logical, 
and methodological flaws in the analyses lead to spurious 
correlations propping up specious conclusions. The critics of the 
legal origins theory have forced a reconsideration of whether specific 
legal rules can explain variations in financial development, but there 
do seem to be resilient patterns of variation with respect to the 
relation between legal families and more easily operationalized 
variables like dividends and financial market development. So it is 
likely that something is being measured and some real, and apparently 
systematic, variation has been detected. Without much more reliable 
data and much more detailed historical research, it is difficult and 
perhaps impossible to determine the cause of these variations.  
If substantive law does not provide an answer, is it plausible that 
legal families are actually proxies for other political factors? This is 
fertile ground for further research on both colonial legacies and on 
the determinants of national corporate governance regimes and 
financial development, only the most general sketch of which can be 
presented here. A number of possible political economic 
characteristics may prove to have explanatory power. One might 
construct studies to examine the influence of state institutional 
structures; including parliamentary versus presidential systems, or 
majoritarian versus proportional representation electoral and party 
systems. Likewise, studies could analyze the complementarities and 
contradictions among institutions that constitute the political 
economy as a complex system. More difficult to measure are state 
capacities to exercise power and govern efficiently across different 
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policy domains. Finally, and perhaps most difficult to quantitatively 
measure are informal power relations among elites, the influence of 
informal norms in political and economic culture, corruption, and 
the relative development of the rule of law.  
A number of studies in the colonial legacies literature cling to the 
common law-civil law distinction as the principal explanatory variable 
in accounting for differential development.125 However, like the legal 
origins literature proper, these studies do not sufficiently address the 
potentially, perhaps likely, confounding effect of other political 
variables, such as those listed in the preceding paragraph, closely 
correlated with differences among colonial powers at different points 
in history. Once again, the common law-civil law distinction may be 
a proxy for other legacies of colonial rule and the studies do not 
adequately address this possibility.  
Former colonies among the developing countries offer other 
political and historical characteristics for analysis as potential 
contributors to developmental outcomes after independence.126 In 
these countries, the legal family initially was imposed, not as an 
accident of political birth, but as a mechanism of colonial rule that 
may have had any of a number of different objectives. These 
mechanisms ranging from brutal exploitation and resource extraction 
(as in the Belgian Congo) to the creation of self-sustaining and 
increasingly autonomous political and economic systems (as was the 
case in Britain’s North American and Australian colonies). Yet, the 
character of political authority and the structure of its political and 
legal institutions, along with the primary purposes they served, varied 
not only across different colonial powers, but across a single 
colonizer’s territories. The manner of colonial rule is a substantial 
determinant of its institutional and juridical legacies—not just the 
identity of a given colonizing power, its legal tradition, or even the 
 
 125. See, e.g., Sandra Fullerton Joireman, Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of 
Law: Africa and the Colonial Legacy, 39 J. MOD. AFRICAN STUD. 571, 573–76 (2001); Darryl 
G. Waldron, Latin America’s Colonial Legacy: The Law and Its Relationship to Economic 
Development, 48 THUNDERBIRD INT’L BUS. REV. 321, 339–42 (2006). 
 126. See, e.g., Grazilla Bertocchi & Fabio Canova, Did Colonization Matter for Growth? 
An Empirical Exploration into the Historical Causes of Africa’s Underdevelopment, 46 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 1851 (2002); Gustav Hansson, What Determines Rule of Law? An Empirical 
Investigation of Rival Models, 62 KYKLOS 371 (2009) (review and econometric testing of 
competing theories of the determinants of the rule of law). 
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degree of its control over a territory.127 Legal families may function as 
proxies of varying strength for the identity of the colonial ruler, the 
degree to which its political and legal institutions were replicated in 
the territory, or whether the colonial institutions were primarily 
extractive or devised to build up a self-sustaining local political and 
economic system.128  
IX. CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the intensive criticism of the legal origins 
theory and its empirical findings, the legal origins theory has 
significantly influenced the study of finance, corporate governance, 
and their cross-national variation. Indeed, these criticisms reflect the 
 
 127. Cf. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James Robinson, The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001) 
(testing the hypothesis that extractive colonization produced enduring post-colonial legacies 
inimical to economic growth). 
 128. See generally JONATHAN TABOR KRIECKHAUS, DICTATING DEVELOPMENT: HOW 
EUROPE SHAPED THE GLOBAL PERIPHERY (2006); Michael Bernhard, Christopher Reenock & 
Timothy Nordstrom, The Legacy of Western Overseas Colonialism on Democratic Survival, 48 
INT’L STUD. Q. 225 (2004) (arguing that the legacy of specific colonial powers continues to 
have an important effect on survival of democratic regimes); Robin Grier, Colonial Legacies 
and Economic Growth, 98 PUB. CHOICE, 317 (1999) (comparing effects of differing colonial 
policies in former British and French Colonies in Africa); Robin Grier, The Effect of Religion on 
Economic Development: A Cross National Study of 63 Former Colonies, 50 KYKLOS 47 (1997) 
(examining the theory that prevailing religious thought has affected economic growth in 
former British and Spanish colonies in Latin America); Hansson, supra note 126; Gregory N. 
Price, Economic Growth in a Cross-section of Nonindustrial Countries: Does Colonial Heritage 
Matter for Africa?, 7 REV. DEV. ECON. 478, 478–95 (2003) (suggesting that extractive 
colonial policies account for a portion of the growth gap between former colonies in Sub-
Saharan Africa and other nonindustrial countries). These alternative theories of the origins of 
law and governance produce a proliferation of variables, in addition to legal families, that can 
be incorporated into empirical analysis, including (1) the identity of the colonial power 
(including religious heritage), (2) the degree to which the colony was settled by immigrants 
from the colonizing power (and the indigenous population killed or displaced), (3) the 
political and governance structures (e.g., bureaucracies, courts, legislatures) and policies (e.g., 
general and legal education, physical infrastructure, etc.) introduced during colonialization, (4) 
the exercise of direct or indirect rule, (5) the timing of initial colonization, (6) the duration of 
colonization, (7) the manner of achieving independence, and (8) the time elapsed since 
independence. Of course, data availability, comparability, and quality are a problem in 
grappling with these variables and may require the use of proxy variables. See Acemoglu et al., 
supra note 127, at 1370, 1374–75 (using high settler mortality as a proxy for the imposition of 
highly extractive forms of colonial organization and rule); Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 
Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?, 114 Q.J. 
ECON. 83 (1999) (using latitude and the fraction of the population speaking a European 
language as proxies for the extent of Western European influence on colonial and post-colonial 
society and polity). 
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fact that they were among the first to attempt such wide-ranging 
studies of the relationship between law and finance, and because they 
were so successful in articulating, deepening, and expanding a well-
defined research agenda that leveraged the intellectual appeal and 
policy influence of microeconomic theory and econometrics. This 
has had a salutary effect on comparative legal and economic research 
in that the legal origins literature has provided important evidence 
regarding cross-national variations in law and financial systems, and 
helped to shed light on the relationships between them. The 
revisions to LLSV’s metrics and scoring may produce new findings 
that are illuminating, unexpected, and robust.  
Even in its flaws, the legal origins literature has inspired scholars 
of comparative law, economics, and politics to look at corporate 
governance and financial systems in a broader frame of reference 
that, for all of its many challenges and limitations, is increasingly 
important in an era of international financial markets and legal 
reform. The contention that law matters was salutary at a time when 
private ordering captivated many in academic and policy circles. The 
import of law may be better made through more qualitative and 
historically grounded research, but well-designed and carefully 
executed quantitative studies can provide valuable, if partial, insights 
into broad patterns of legal, institutional, and economic organization 
and development. An extraordinary range of scholars who have 
followed their lead into related research areas owe LLSV a debt of 
gratitude for that even if they depart from the path of legal origins 
and leave the theory and its conclusions behind them.  
On the other hand, legal origins theory have not been as 
successful in elucidating the development of law and legal 
institutions, or in enhancing our understanding of the operation of 
particular national corporate governance regimes. The quantitative 
analyses marshaled in its support have been crippled by theoretical 
and methodological limitations. It is strikingly ironic that LLSV’s 
legal origins work, while premised on, and devoted to, empirically 
corroborating the proposition that law matters, should treat law in 
such a highly reductionist fashion. Indeed, LLSV have reduced law 
to such an extent that they find that legal family of origin matters in 
contexts where the rule of law itself is exceedingly weak. This 
suggests both a methodological problem of treating dissimilar cases 
alike in ways that tend to generate logically questionable or spurious 
findings, and deeper theoretical problems of excessive formalism and 
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functionalism, common to much economic theory and analysis. 
These deeper problems lose sight of the complexity of substantive 
and procedural law, and the institutional arrangements in which they 
are situated and that determine their effectiveness and practical 
import.  
Large-n quantitative analysis is bedeviled by a trade-off: what is 
gained in range and scope useful to discern broad patterns in 
variation is lost in empirical detail and richness that permits us to 
understand how legal systems function as part of the broader 
political economy and the causal channels that drive the 
development of law and institutions over time. The abstract 
universality and ahistorical character of the functional categories and 
variables expand the theory’s reach and generalizability of its 
findings, but become a weakness when the empirical analysis elides 
substantial changes in national legal and financial systems. Further, 
the highly deterministic and path dependent logic of the legal origins 
theory is in tension with global political and juridical trends towards 
substantial reform of corporate governance and securities market 
regulation during the past twenty-five years. The theory offers a 
comparative statics relationship between specific types of legal rules 
to increased financial development when recent history and current 
events call for a dynamic theory of institutional and juridical change.  
The legal origins theory also tends to homogenize the country 
cases, failing to distinguish adequately among country cases with 
respect to differences in rule of law and institutional arrangements, 
while universalizing the normative implications and prescriptions 
derived from the studies. Developed and less developed countries 
cannot be subject to identical forms of analysis without distorting the 
findings. Colonial legacies and persistent power imbalances within 
the international system cannot be ignored or reduced to differences 
in legal origins. There is a notable bias in the framing of quality of 
law in the LLSV literature that favors pro-shareholder legal rules and 
higher levels of financial development. The theory tends to support 
the adoption of “high quality” legal rules regardless of local legal, 
institutional, or political conditions as a means of securing growth of 
equities markets and financial system development. After the collapse 
of the global financial system and the role of international markets in 
transmitting the crisis cross-nationally, this sanguine view of finance 
and markets is due for a searching reappraisal.  
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These limitations point to the potential value-added of 
institutionalist theories and more fine-grained qualitative and 
historically grounded empirical research to the study of the 
relationships among law, finance, and politics. Qualitative political 
and institutional analysis, along with traditional legal scholarship, 
takes seriously the political and juridical dimensions of financial 
systems and corporate governance regimes and can fill in the wide 
gaps—and correct the occasional distortions—left by economic 
theory and econometric analysis. By all means, the large-n analysis of 
these phenomena should be continued. Let a hundred scholarly 
flowers bloom, and do not mistake the vast size of the garden 
through intellectual blinders.  
 
 
